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The Relation Between Culture, Cognition, and Bias:  
An Introduction 
 
Some time ago I overheard Esther and Saskia discussing and comparing their 
scores on a fourth grade spelling test. Prathima also heard the two Dutch girls 
talking, but did not fully understand what was said. She moved with her family to 
the Netherlands last summer and is struggling to understand and speak Dutch. 
Even though Esther, Saskia, and Prathima are of the same age and attend the same 
grade, one immediately senses that it would be unfair to directly compare Esther’s 
or Saskia’s scores with Prathima’s scores on a Dutch spelling test. Prathima would 
most likely perform poorer because she does not master the language, but does 
that mean that she is worse at spelling? Not necessarily; she might be a skilled 
speller in her mother tongue. What about comparing scores on a mathematics 
test? Every school going child learns to make calculations, but Prathima is not 
necessarily familiar with the same type of mathematics exercises and tests as the 
other girls. This could adversely affect her performance. When directly comparing 
school performance can already be problematic for children in the same 
classroom, how can we then compare a Dutch child’s test performance to that of a 
child living in India? Bias is the name for the cause of such comparability 
problems and plays a key role in this dissertation.  
 
The broad underlying question I address in this dissertation is how culture and 
children’s cognition are related. Bias-related issues in assessing cognition and in 
assessing characteristics of a child’s home environment play an important role in 
studying this relation. Taking into account bias, I shed light on the link between 
the concepts of culture and cognition from three angles. The first focuses on 
detecting and reducing bias in cognitive tests to obtain a better understanding of 
the relation between these concepts. Is a cognitive test suitable outside of the 
context in which it was originally developed? How do we know if a test is biased? 
Introduction 
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Knowing that a test is biased, how can this test be made appropriate for the target 
group? For the second angle, I extend the examination of cultural influences on 
the appropriateness of cognitive tests to cultural influences on the relation 
between a child’s home environment and cognition. How does the home 
environment of a child relate to a child’s cognitive performance and to what 
extent are theoretical models on this relation (usually developed in Western 
countries) applicable in a non-Western context? Whereas the first two angles 
focus on minimizing bias, the third and last angle focuses on experimentally 
manipulating bias. Knowing how to detect and reduce bias also provides 
information on how to introduce and manipulate bias. How does content 
familiarity influence cognitive test performance? Why are cross-cultural 
differences larger on some cognitive tests than on others? To answer these specific 
questions, I take the issue of bias to another level by experimentally manipulating 
its presence for various cognitive tests and administering the resulting test 
versions to various (cultural) groups.  
 
This dissertation adds to the existing literature in three ways. First and foremost, it 
integrates the concepts of culture, cognition, and bias. Bias is not merely treated as 
a measurement problem that should be avoided; it is anticipated on, examined, 
and manipulated by including it in the study design. By taking bias into account 
rather than avoiding it, a better understanding of the relation between culture and 
cognition can be obtained. Second, this dissertation systematically addresses this 
relation from various angles. Third, it addresses the link between culture and 
cognition in two contexts that provide excellent conditions to do so: India and 
South Africa. Both countries are multicultural and do not belong to the Western 
countries in which most cognitive tests are developed. Many tests that are used in 
India and South Africa have been imported from these Western countries. The 
larger the cross-cultural differences between the original and target context, the 
more potential sources of bias, providing good conditions for a critical test of the 
(cross-cultural) applicability of cognitive tests and of models relating a child’s 




The practical relevance of this dissertation lies in three aspects. First, it contributes 
to an understanding of the nature of cross-cultural score differences. Second, it 
provides guidelines for adequate, culture-informed test development. Appropriate 
instruments to assess child outcomes are needed to implement meaningful 
interventions that foster child development. In addition, we need to know which 
factors in the (day to day) environment of the child positively or negatively relate 
to these outcomes to identify targets for such interventions. The third practical 
contribution of this dissertation is the examination of (the cross-cultural validity 
of) the relations between certain variables in the home environment and a child’s 
cognitive performance. 
 
Three terms are repeatedly used throughout the text: culture, cognition, and bias. 




What is culture? 
Numerous definitions of “culture” have been reported, illustrating the difficulty of 
capturing the term’s meaning (Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 2002; Segall, 
Dasen, Berry, & Poortinga, 1999). Tylor (1871) was the first to provide a definition 
from an anthropological perspective: “that complex whole which includes 
knowledge, belief, art, morals, laws, customs, and any other capabilities and habits 
acquired by man as a member of society” (p. 1). Based on their review of 
definitions of culture, Kroebner and Kluckhohn (1963) arrived at the following 
definition: 
 
Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior 
acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive 
achievement of human groups, including their embodiments of artifacts; 
the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e., historically derived 
and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture systems 
Introduction 
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may, on the one hand, be considered as products of actions, on the other 
as conditioning elements of further action. (p. 357) 
 
Culture is in every person and can be seen at different levels; from high (implicit 
and abstract) to low (explicit and concrete). On the highest level, culture reflects 
ideologies, norms, and values. This high level is operationalized in lower levels 
such as the child’s direct living environment (e.g., education, language, daily 
activities, parental behaviors, and toys). This dissertation mainly focuses on the 
lower levels of culture that are more directly related to a child’s cognitive 
performance.  
 
Distinguishing between culture, society, and country 
It might seem hard to distinguish the term culture from the term society; yet, the 
two are not the same (Berry et al., 2002). “Society” can be defined as “people who 
interact in a defined space and share culture” (Macionis & Plummer, 1998, p. 66). 
Society then concerns a group of interacting people, whereas culture concerns 
their way of life. Neither a society nor a culture coincides with the borders of a 
country. People speak of “Western society”, which is not limited to one particular 
country. Also, there is no such thing as “the Indian culture”; all India’s languages, 
religions, beliefs, and other explicit or implicit references to a way of life, cannot 
be subsumed under one common denominator that carries a significant meaning. 
The boundaries of a culture or society seem to depend on the level of concreteness 
by which these terms are examined; the more specific the aspects of interest, the 
stricter the boundaries. This implies that what is referred to as culture can differ 
across studies, making it important to be aware of a study’s frame of reference. 
 
Absolutism, universalism, and relativism 
An important distinction in light of this dissertation is the one between cultural 
absolutism, universalism, and relativism (Berry et al., 2002). Absolutism is based 
on the assumption that all psychological processes and the way they are expressed 




across the globe can be directly compared without worrying about confounding 
factors; culture does not play a role. Universalism is based on the assumption that 
underlying psychological processes are universal, but the ways in which they are 
expressed are context-dependent. From a relativistic viewpoint, cultural 
characteristics are described without references to other cultures; they are 
observed from the viewpoint of one particular culture. In this dissertation, I adopt 
a universalistic approach. Cognitive abilities are assumed to be universal; the 




What is cognition? 
Cognition can be defined as “the mental process of knowing, including aspects 
such as awareness, perception, reasoning, and judgment” ("The free dictionary", 
n.d.). Other examples of cognitive activities are attending, learning, thinking, and 
remembering. A cognitive task is “any task in which correct or appropriate 
processing of mental information is critical to successful performance” (Carroll, 
1993, p. 10). A cognitive ability is then any ability “that concerns some class of 
cognitive tasks” (Carroll, 1993, p. 10). Memory span, word fluency, reading 
comprehension, and visualization are all examples of cognitive abilities.  
 
Theories on cognitive abilities 
Various theories have been described on the structure of cognitive abilities (see 
Flanagan & Harrison, 2005). The studies in this dissertation employ the Cattell-
Horn-Carroll (CHC) model of cognitive abilities, which integrates two models. 
The first is the Cattell-Horn Gf-Gc theory, distinguishing between fluid and 
crystallized cognitive abilities. Fluid abilities reflect the “use of deliberate and 
controlled mental operations to solve novel, ‘on-the-spot’ problems (i.e., tasks that 
cannot be performed automatically)” (McGrew, 2005, p. 151). Crystallized abilities 
are “typically described as a person’s wealth (breadth and depth) of acquired 
knowledge of the language, information and concepts of a specific culture, and/or 
Introduction 
 12 
the application of this knowledge” (McGrew, 2005, p. 151). The second model is 
Carroll’s three-stratum theory (Carroll, 1993; McGrew, 2005), which resulted 
from factor analyzing over 460 cognitive data sets and describes three levels (three 
strata) of cognitive abilities. Abilities on the first level (Stratum I) are specific 
cognitive abilities, such as visual memory and spatial scanning. Factor analyzing 
all Stratum I abilities results in eight broad ability factors (Stratum II); examples 
are general memory and learning, and broad visual perception. The eight broad 
ability factors load on one general cognitive ability factor, which reflects the 
highest level (Stratum III). 
 
Cognition versus intelligence 
The reader might wonder why I am not using the term “intelligence” rather than 
“cognition” to describe one of the key topics of this dissertation. At first glance it 
seems as if these terms are interchangeable and “intelligence” seems to be a more 
accessible term, requiring less explanation. This is not the case, though. I 
intentionally do not use “intelligence” here. Ever since the term was first 
described in a psychology text by Herbert Spencer in the second half of the 19th 
century, it has been the subject of much debate (Wasserman & Tulsky, 2005). One 
of the most cited definitions of “intelligence” comes from David Wechsler 
(Wechsler, 1939): 
 
Intelligence is the aggregate or global capacity of the individual to act 
purposefully, to think rationally and to deal effectively with his 
environment. It is global because it characterizes the individual’s behavior 
as a whole; it is an aggregate because it is composed of elements or 
abilities which, though not entirely independent, are qualitatively 
differentiable. (p. 3) 
 
According to this definition (and many others), intelligence is not confined to one 
area of an individual’s thoughts or behaviors. Western views of intelligence focus 




studies in Zambia (Serpell, 1993), Japan (Azuma & Kashiwagi, 1987), and Kenya 
(Grigorenko et al., 2001) show that descriptions of an intelligent person go beyond 
the school-oriented domain that is commonly associated with intelligence in the 
U.S. and Europe. Social aspects are usually more relevant in everyday definitions 
in non-Western countries (Srivastava & Misra, 2001). The cross-cultural 
differences in emphasis on particular aspects of intelligence make the term 
ambiguous. The current dissertation specifically focuses on cognition. Unlike 
“intelligence”, which implies a subjective evaluation of purposefulness, rationality 




What is bias? 
One of the goals in cross-cultural research is to use measures and methods that are 
valid in the context in which they are applied. In this dissertation I consider bias 
as a generic term for all kinds of factors that threaten the validity of comparisons 
between cultural groups (Van de Vijver & Hambleton, 1996). Test bias is a 
consequence of a test’s cultural loading, which refers to the extent to which the 
test implicitly or explicitly refers to a particular cultural context. There are three 
main types of test bias: construct bias, method bias, and item bias (Van de Vijver & 
Poortinga, 2005; Van de Vijver & Tanzer, 2004).  
 
Construct bias, method bias, and item bias 
An instrument that shows construct bias in a cross-cultural comparison does not 
measure the same psychological concept across cultures. The earlier described 
problems with the definition of intelligence form a good example. Method bias 
refers to sources of bias that arise from methodological aspects of a study. There 
are different types of method bias, two of which are relevant for the studies 
addressed here. The first is instrument bias, which occurs when (cultural) groups 
show differential familiarity with stimulus materials (e.g., geometric shapes) or 
response procedures and styles (e.g., multiple choice response format). The second 
Introduction 
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relevant type of method bias is administration bias. Examples are differences in 
environmental administration conditions (e.g., lack of comparability of testing 
rooms), differences in expertise of test administrators, and communication 
problems between administrator and participant. Item bias (differential item 
functioning) refers to item-specific problems in cross-cultural comparisons, such 
as item ambiguity due to poor item translations. Culture-specific elements can also 
be a source of item bias (e.g., an item about a vacuum cleaner is biased against 
cultures in which this appliance is uncommon).  
 
How can we reduce bias? Adoption, assembly, or adaptation  
Three terms have been proposed to describe the transformations that may be 
needed to transfer an instrument to another culture: adoption (or application), 
assembly, and adaptation (Van de Vijver, 2003). Adoption refers to a close 
translation into the target language. Assembly involves the construction of an 
entirely new instrument (Harkness, Van de Vijver, & Johnson, 2003). Adaptation 
has features of both adoption and assembly; it combines a close translation of the 
parts of the instrument that are assumed to be adequate in the target culture, such 
as test instructions, with a change of parts for which linguistic, cultural, or 
psychometric reasons make a close translation inadequate (Hambleton & De Jong, 
2003; Harkness, Mohler, & Van de Vijver, 2003).  
 
The choice of procedure depends on the translatability (Van de Vijver & 
Poortinga, 2005) and the expected suitability of the original instrument in the 
target culture (Hambleton & Patsula, 1998). Adoption of an instrument can be 
used if the purpose of a study is to compare scores across cultures directly (Van de 
Vijver, 2003); however, adoption may ignore relevant features of the target 
culture. For instance, a Western test of intelligence can overlook important social 
aspects that are part of the definition of intelligence in a non-Western context. 
The cultural appropriateness of the instrument in the target culture may be 
enhanced by using assemblies and adaptations (Hambleton & Patsula, 1999), 




scores. Assembly is applied when the original and target culture differ to such an 
extent that hardly any aspect of the original instrument can be retained, or when 
the study concerns a new research topic for which no suitable instrument is 
available yet. In case of an assembly, there is no identical instrument available in 
another culture which entirely rules out the possibility to compare scores. In case 
of an adaptation, these problems can be remedied to some extent by using 
sophisticated statistical (a posteriori) procedures that enable comparisons even 
when instruments are not entirely identical, such as item response theory and 
structural equation modeling (Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). Adaptation is the 
main method of transfer in this dissertation. One of the core questions in each of 
the following chapters is how to make an existing Western-based assessment 
instrument appropriate for use in an entirely different cultural context, which 
requires much flexibility in changing items, while retaining the basic structure. 
 
Integrating culture, cognition and bias 
In this dissertation I show that bias is inevitably part of studies on the relation 
between culture and cognition. Figure 1.1 shows a simplified model relating the 
concepts of culture, cognition, and bias. The figure shows that culture (in the 
broadest sense of the word) determines the extent to which assessment 
instruments are biased, and this bias in turn affects the measurement of a lower 
level of culture, namely, the direct environment of the child (home, school, 
peers). Bias also affects the measurement of the relation between a child’s 
environment and cognition, and of cognition itself. Ideally, a child’s actual 
cognitive abilities and cognitive abilities as reflected by test scores are 
interchangeable. Unfortunately, when there is bias in the assessment instruments, 
the two are not necessarily identical. In the absence of bias, the influence of 
culture on cognition is confined to the salience of certain factors in the 
environment of the child, of certain environment-cognition relations and of 
certain cognitive abilities. Cognitive abilities and many environmental factors are 
assumed to be universal; the cultural context determines the importance attached 















A model of culture, cognition, and bias 
 
This dissertation 
Who are studied? 
This dissertation focuses on children in middle childhood, between 6 and 10 years 
old, from primary school grades 2 to 5. Primary schooling forms the basis for 
(decisions on) further education, which makes this phase very important in a 
child’s educational career. This importance results in a high need for the 
awareness and reduction of bias in assessment instruments, so as to obtain a valid 
estimation of a child’s cognitive abilities. Only children with at least one year of 
formal education are included in the studies to ensure some skill development 
needed in cognitive testing procedures, such as language skills, understanding of 
instructions, and familiarity with performing on tasks. I confine the sample to 
children in middle childhood because the studies do not have the purpose of 
identifying developmental trends across age groups.  
 
Overview of chapters 
Figure 1.1 shows that bias can affect the measurement of cognition. A cross-











of the tested groups is invalid. How do we know if a test is biased? What is the 
next step if we know that a test is biased? How can this test be made appropriate 
for the target group? I aim to answer these questions in Chapter 2. 
 
There are two types of procedures to detect and reduce bias, namely a priori and a 
posteriori procedures. The former involve a qualitative, judgmental approach, such 
as piloting test items to investigate their cultural appropriateness and adapting 
items accordingly, before data collection starts. The latter are statistical procedures 
and are applied after data collection. Chapter 2 focuses on a priori procedures in 
adapting the Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children, second edition (KABC-II) 
for 6- to 10-year-old Kannada-speaking children of low socioeconomic status in 
Bangalore, India. Many guidelines exist on how adaptations should be made 
(American Educational Research Association, American Psychological 
Association, & National Council on Measurement of Education, 1999; Hambleton, 
2001); however, a combination of these theoretical guidelines and a detailed 
illustration of their application has hardly been described. Chapter 2 proposes and 
applies a systematic, qualitative approach to adapt cognitive tests. The adapted 
KABC-II results from a pilot study with 57 children. 
 
After the qualitative (non-empirical) procedures to increase the cultural suitability 
of a cognitive instrument as described in Chapter 2, the next question is how the 
appropriateness of the adaptation can be statistically checked. Is an adaptation of a 
Western cognitive instrument for a non-Westernized resource-limited setting 
reliable and valid? Chapter 3 focuses on this question. Quantitative criteria to 
assess the quality of an adaptation include the instrument’s validity and reliability. 
Chapter 3 tests whether the adapted version of the KABC-II meets three validity 
criteria; first, the theoretical model underlying the original instrument (the CHC-
model) should be well represented in the data; second, relations of test scores with 
demographic variables such as children’s age and sex should be according to 
expectations; third, relations of test scores with presumably related psychological 
constructs (such as scholastic achievement) should be according to expectations. 
Introduction 
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Reliabilities of all adapted subtests are addressed as well. Data are collected for 598 
children 6- to 10-year-old Kannada-speaking children of low socioeconomic status 
in Bangalore, India. 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 describe a qualitative approach and a following quantitative 
approach to ensure the cultural appropriateness of a cognitive test adaptation. I 
extend the examination of cultural influences on the appropriateness of cognitive 
tests to cultural influences on the relations between a child’s home environment 
and cognition in Chapter 4. As shown in Figure 1.1, culture can influence the 
salience of certain environment-cognition relations and culture can induce bias in 
measuring them. To what extent are Western models on these relations applicable 
in a non-Western context? The structure of these links is expected to hold across 
cultures; yet, both their significance and strength may vary. Chapter 4 examines 
the suitability of the combined Western investment model and the family stress 
model (Guo & Harris, 2000; Yeung, Linver, & Brooks-Gunn, 2002) for studying 
relations between home factors and children’s cognitive outcomes in families of 
low socioeconomic status in Bangalore. The investment model holds that if more 
financial resources are invested in children, children will have access to more 
materials and activities that can enhance their cognitive performance. The family 
process or family stress model (Conger et al., 2002) relates low income to material 
hardship and resultant parental stress, which can affect child development 
through mediating variables, such as parental behaviors. Both models can be 
viewed from a proximal-distal perspective (Bronfenbrenner, 1979), reflecting the 
relative proximity of environmental variables to child outcomes. Socioeconomic 
status can be seen as a variable with a distal, more general influence on these 
outcomes, whereas parental behaviors are more proximal, with a focused 
influence. The primary caregivers of 532 children that underwent the KABC-II 
test administration (see Chapter 3) are interviewed. Questionnaires cover 
socioeconomic status, general mental health, perceived social support, family 
conflict, and parental behaviors. The relations between all variables are tested in a 




After focusing on the cross-cultural validity of a Western cognitive test (Chapters 
2 and 3) and of Western models relating home environment to cognitive 
performance (Chapter 4), Chapter 5 takes the issue of bias to another level by 
experimentally manipulating it. Why are larger cross-cultural differences found 
on some cognitive tests (fluid reasoning tests) than on others (short-term memory 
and attention tests)? Spearman’s Hypothesis (SH) relates these cross-cultural 
differences to the cognitive complexity of tests; differences are larger for tests with 
a higher cognitive complexity (Jensen, 1985, 1998). SH assumes that there are 
cross-cultural differences in the underlying general cognitive ability on which 
tests with higher cognitively complexity more strongly rely. I believe, however, 
that it is cultural complexity rather than cognitive complexity that explains these 
differences (Helms-Lorenz, Van de Vijver, & Poortinga, 2003) and expect fluid 
reasoning tests to be more sensitive to cultural information than other (more basic 
cognitive) tests. Cultural complexity is conceptualized in the present study as the 
extent to which test content (i.e., words, drawings) is more familiar to one of the 
compared groups. In Chapter 5, the content familiarity of five cognitive tests (for 
short-term memory, attention, working memory, and figural and verbal fluid 
reasoning) is manipulated to examine its differential effect on test performance for 
three groups of South African children: 161 Afrikaans, 181 urban Tswana, and 159 
rural Tswana children in the third and fourth grade of primary school. 
 
Chapters 2 to 5 are based on published and submitted articles that can be read 
independently of one another. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are part of one project, which 
implies some overlap in content. Chapter 6 summarizes the reported findings and 







Adapting a Cognitive Test for a Different Culture: 
An Illustration of Qualitative Procedures1 
 
...You cannot take a person who for years has been hobbled by chains, 
bring him up to the starting line of a race and say – you are free to 
compete with us – and truly believe that you are treating him fairly. 
    Lyndon Johnson (as cited in De Beer, 2000, p. 1) 
 
Varying definitions of fairness have been proposed; fairness can be seen as an 
absence of bias, as equitable treatment in a testing procedure, as equality in 
outcomes of testing, or as equality in opportunities to learn (American Educational 
Research Association, American Psychological Association, & National Council on 
Measurement of Education, 1999). The quote by Lyndon Johnson refers to the last 
definition, whereas we mainly focus on the first. Like it is unfair to run a race 
against a person hobbled by chains, it is unfair to assess cognitive abilities of 
children from rural Africa with a test that has been validated in a Western culture 
(usually in the U.S. or Western Europe), with a population of children exposed to 
very different educational and material environments at home and school. Many 
children in developing and emerging countries live in multiple-risk environments 
and show suboptimal (physical, cognitive, and social-emotional) developmental 
outcomes, due to poor nutrition, housing, and hygiene, low socioeconomic status, 
crowded homes and classrooms, and few learning materials and opportunities 
(McLoyd, 1998; Walker et al., 2007). Cognitive tests of Western origin may be 
inadequate to assess these children; the cross-cultural suitability of these tests 
cannot be assumed, is often questionable, and is infrequently studied (Misra, 
Sahoo, & Puhan, 1997). Since cognitive test scores are known to predict school 
performance of children (also in non-Westernized countries), it is important for 
                                                   
1 This chapter is based on Malda et al. (2008) 
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them to be (culturally) appropriate. We propose and illustrate a systematic 
approach for adapting cognitive instruments to increase their cultural suitability 
for the target context.  
 
Children in non-Westernized countries might be unfamiliar with testing 
procedures and materials, which is in sharp contrast with the relatively high level 
of testwiseness of Western children. For example, working with figures and 
puzzles may be a novel experience for children in a non-Westernized setting, 
whereas many Western children are exposed to these tasks from a preschool level. 
Making puzzles or comparable tasks can positively contribute to one’s visual 
processing ability. Demetriou et al. (2005) found that Chinese children 
outperformed Greek children on tasks involving visuo-spatial processing, which 
the authors attributed to the massive visuo-spatial practice received in learning to 
write Chinese. 
 
The use of an unsuitable instrument can lead to a biased (unfair) assessment of 
cognitive performance; therefore, two types of procedures have been described to 
reduce this bias: a priori procedures (also called judgmental procedures) and a 
posteriori procedures (statistical procedures). A priori procedures are applied 
before the instrument is administered; we refer here to all those procedures that 
use judgmental evidence to examine the cultural suitability of translations and 
adaptations of instruments, such as quality checks of translations, examinations of 
the adequacy of pictorial stimuli, and pilot studies to determine whether test 
instructions and items are interpreted as intended. A posteriori procedures are 
applied to the data obtained with the instrument; these involve the use of 
statistical methods to identify and reduce the bias in collected data (Van de Vijver 
& Leung, 1997). A posteriori procedures are widely used to examine differential 
item functioning and structural equivalence (see Ellis, 1989; Sireci & Allalouf, 
2003; Sireci, Yang, Harter, & Ehrlich, 2006). We describe and apply a priori 




procedures are very relevant; problems of poor test adaptations cannot be 
overcome in statistical (post hoc) analyses, whatever their sophistication.  
 
Many guidelines for test adaptations have been proposed (American Educational 
Research Association et al., 1999; Hambleton, 2001, 2005); yet, there is no 
agreement about minimum standards or best practices and very few applications 
have been published (Abubakar et al., 2007; Holding et al., 2004). Whereas these 
applications are mainly described from a procedural point of view, we 
conceptualize our approach by applying a systematic procedure for adapting 
cognitive instruments within a framework of adaptation types. We illustrate this 
approach by describing the adaptation process of the Kaufman Assessment Battery 
for Children, second edition (KABC-II) for use among 6 to 10-year-old Kannada-
speaking children of low socioeconomic status in Bangalore, India. Our aim was to 
develop a measure of children’s cognitive performance that is suitable for this 
particular context and to learn lessons from this adaptation procedure that could 
generalize to other settings and cognitive test batteries, such as the Wechsler 
scales (Wechsler, 1949, 1974, 1991, 1997, 2004).  
 
Test adaptation procedure 
The adaptation procedure that is proposed and illustrated here has two core 
elements. The first refers to how the procedure is conducted. Our procedure 
consists of an iterative process of implementing modifications to an instrument 
and using judgmental evidence to examine the adequacy of the modifications. This 
procedure is in line with what is called “cognitive pretesting” or “cognitive 
interviewing” (DeMaio & Rothgeb, 1996; Willis, 2005), which refers to a method 
to evaluate whether the target audience properly understands, processes, and 
responds to the test items. Cognitive pretesting uses think-aloud and verbal 
probing procedures, and has been mainly applied to evaluate surveys; yet, it can be 
used to test any type of test material. A criterion for the success of a judgmental 
procedure such as cognitive pretesting is that all items of the battery are 
interpreted as intended. The second core element of our procedure refers to which 
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types of adaptation are involved; a taxonomy of adaptation types is proposed here 
that can be used in any cognitive adaptation procedure. Before presenting the 
taxonomy we describe the various kinds of bias that may need to be accounted for 
in test adaptations.  
 
Bias in testing 
In cross-cultural research, bias is a generic term for all kinds of factors that 
threaten the validity of intergroup comparisons (Van de Vijver & Hambleton, 
1996). Bias is a consequence of a test’s cultural loading, which refers to the extent 
to which the test implicitly or explicitly refers to a particular cultural context. 
There are three main types of bias: construct bias, method bias, and item bias (for 
a detailed description see Van de Vijver & Poortinga, 2005, and Van de Vijver & 
Tanzer, 2004). An instrument that shows construct bias in a cross-cultural 
comparison does not measure the same psychological concept across cultures. We 
did not focus on construct bias in our adaptation because the underlying structures 
of many cognitive test batteries presumably are universally applicable (Berry, 
Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 2002; Georgas, Weiss, Van de Vijver, & Saklofske, 
2003; Irvine, 1979; Van de Vijver, 1997). Method bias refers to sources of bias that 
arise from methodological aspects of a study, such as instrument bias and 
administration bias. Item bias (differential item functioning) refers to item-specific 
problems in cross-cultural comparisons, such as item ambiguity due to poor item 
translations or culture-specific elements (e.g., an item about a vacuum cleaner is 
biased against cultures in which this appliance is uncommon). The described 
forms of bias can be remedied by adaptation. 
 
Adoption, assembly, and adaptation 
Adaptation is a way to maximize the cultural appropriateness of an instrument and 
thereby to minimize bias. Adaptation has become the generic term for any 
procedure in which an instrument that is developed for one cultural group is 
transferred for usage in another cultural group. The term has replaced the 




transferring a test to a new cultural and linguistic context involves more than 
merely translating an instrument (producing a linguistically equivalent version in 
another language).  
 
The term adaptation is also used in a more specific sense. Three terms have been 
proposed to describe the transformations that may be needed to transfer an 
instrument to another culture: adoption (or application), assembly, and adaptation 
(Hambleton & Patsula, 1998, 1999; Van de Vijver, 2003; Van de Vijver & 
Poortinga, 2005). Adoption of an instrument comes down to a close translation 
into the target language, and can be used if the purpose of a study is to compare 
scores across cultures directly (Van de Vijver, 2003). Assembly involves the 
construction of an entirely new instrument, and is usually applied when the 
translation of an existing instrument would yield an entirely inappropriate 
measure in the target culture or when the study concerns a new research topic for 
which no suitable instrument is available yet (Harkness, Van de Vijver, & 
Johnson, 2003). Adaptation has features of both adoption and assembly; it amounts 
to a combination of close translation of the parts of the instrument that are 
assumed to be adequate in the target culture, such as test instructions and items, 
and a change of other parts when a close translation would be inadequate for 
linguistic, cultural, or psychometric reasons (Hambleton & De Jong, 2003; 
Harkness, Mohler, & Van de Vijver, 2003) .  
 
The two different usages of the term adaptation (broad and specific) are fairly 
compatible if we do not see adoption, adaptation, and assembly as three entirely 
different kinds of procedures, but as labels on a continuum that ranges from a 
close translation of all instrument features (adoption) to a complete change of 
these features (assembly). Adaptation can then be seen as a term for all transfers 
that do not belong to the extremes of the continuum. In this interpretation, 
adaptation covers a wide range of changes to tests (which may explain the 
popularity of adaptation in the current literature) and is the main method of 
transfer in our current qualitative evaluation of test appropriateness.  
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Types of adaptation 
Adaptations can amount to various types of changes (Harkness, Van de Vijver et 
al., 2003; Van de Vijver, 2006). We propose a framework of types of adaptation 
which can help us to systematize the adaptation process and the choices made in 
this process. In our view, five types can be distinguished that are relevant in the 
context of adapting cognitive tests. Construct-driven adaptations are related to 
differences in definitions of psychological concepts across cultures (e.g., when the 
aim is to measure “intelligence”, the test should be adapted according to the target 
culture’s definition of intelligence). Language-driven adaptations result from the 
unavailability of semantically equivalent words across languages (e.g., there is no 
Dutch equivalent for the English word “distress”) or from structural differences 
between languages (e.g., words or grammatical structures automatically refer to 
gender in some languages, which makes it difficult to avoid gender-specific 
references. For example, the English word “friend” can indicate both a male and a 
female person, whereas the German word “Freund” refers to a male friend and 
“Freundin” to a female friend). Culture-driven adaptations result from different 
cultural norms, values, communication styles, customs, or practices (e.g., an item 
about the celebration of birthdays should take into account that cultures differ 
considerably in practices and cultural relevance of birthdays). Theory-driven 
adaptations involve changes that are required because of theoretical reasons (e.g., 
digit span items should ideally have digit names that are all of similar length. 
Similarity in digit length may be lost when the items are translated into another 
language). The last type are familiarity/recognizability-driven adaptations which 
are based on differential familiarity with task or item characteristics (e.g., a 
prototypical drawing of a house in one culture is not necessarily recognized as 
such in another culture) or stimulus materials (e.g., in some cultures children 
might not be used to manipulate geometric shapes). Different types of adaptations 
are applicable to different types of tests. We consider these five types of 
adaptations sufficient to describe the changes that are required in making 
cognitive instruments suitable for new cultural contexts. The framework 




the cultural suitability of the KABC-II for our Indian sample and to place our 
findings into the broader perspective of adapting cognitive tests in general.  
 
Adapting the Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children, Second Edition 
The KABC-II (a revised and re-standardized second edition of the K-ABC) is an 
individually administered measure of cognitive ability that can be used for 
children from 3 to 18 years of age (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004) and measures 
short-term memory, visual processing, long-term storage and retrieval, fluid 
reasoning, and crystallized abilities. The test combines three characteristics that 
make it promising for research and applications in non-Westernized countries: (1) 
the KABC-II is based on a theoretical model (the Cattell-Horn-Carroll model of 
broad and narrow abilities; Carroll, 1993; McGrew, 2005) that is assumed to have a 
universal validity; (2) the test has been designed to minimize the influence of 
language and cultural knowledge on test results; (3) the test contains teaching 
items, that ensure understanding of the task demands. 
 
The present study is relevant in providing information about the 
(in)appropriateness of the KABC-II among Kannada-speaking children in 
Bangalore. Furthermore, the relevance of our qualitative adaptation procedure 
goes beyond the immediate context of the present instrument and cultural context 
for two reasons. First, the instrument shows generalizability to other, widely used 
cognitive batteries regarding instruction, item, and response formats. Second, the 
adaptation deals with large cultural, linguistic, and socioeconomic differences 
between the original Western (American) context and the non-Westernized target 
(Indian) context. The larger these differences, the more salient the (possible) bias, 
providing good conditions for a critical test of why and for which test aspects 
adaptations are required. Many other cross-cultural studies on the application of 
cognitive tests (such as the WISC-III by Georgas et al., 2003) do not include 
samples that differ substantially from the original test sample in cultural or 
educational background.  
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Method 
Participants   
Our adaptation is part of a larger study among children of low socioeconomic 
status in Bangalore (state of Karnataka, South India). Fifty seven Kannada-
speaking children took part in the adaptation process (31 boys and 26 girls), they 
were between 6 and 10 years old (M = 8.08) and from grades one to five from five 
primary schools. The number of children participating in our adaptation could not 
be determined nor accurately estimated beforehand, because in each step of the 
iterative procedure of translating, piloting (i.e., cognitive pretesting) and 
modifying that we employed, a new (small) sample of children was involved and 
for each individual subtest the iterations continued until the adaptations were 
deemed satisfactory (see Procedure). As a consequence, the number of children 
involved in the pilot testing differed across the subtests.   
 
Context 
Information about the children’s direct living environment, needed for an 
adequate adaptation, was collected by visiting homes and schools and interviewing 
parents and teachers. We wanted to learn what type of cognitive stimulation was 
provided to the children by their environment. There were very few or no toys to 
play with and usually no other learning materials than school books were present 
in the homes. Most families owned a television. Children either played outside in 
the streets or watched television when not doing chores. Interviews with teachers 
revealed that rote learning is a commonly applied teaching technique. This 
technique is well applicable with large numbers of children and with a 
collectivistic style of teaching, where children are hardly addressed individually.  
 
Procedure  
In line with practices recommended in the literature on adaptation guidelines 
(e.g., Geisinger, 1994; Hambleton, 2005; Hambleton & Patsula, 1999), we 




instructions, examples and items if needed. The adaptation process took eight 
months from developing the initial ideas to completing the final test battery. 
 
A team of four psychologists (all fluent in both Kannada and English, and with a 
Master’s degree in Psychology, specialized in Child Psychology) translated the test 
instructions and items of the KABC-II from (American) English into Kannada. We 
instructed the team to try to avoid poor readability and lack of naturalness, which 
are well known problems of close translations (Harkness, 2003; Stansfield, 2003). 
The translation was independently back translated by a psychologist. The 
translated version was fine-tuned during the pilot test through iterations of 
modifying translations, administering these modifications to other children of the 
pilot sample, and implementing further modifications, if needed. Some subtests 
required more extensive piloting than others and each new subtest version was 
administered in a new round of piloting to a different set of children so as to avoid 
learning effects from previous test versions. The iterative process was continued 
until the subtest version was found to be adequate (i.e., the children showed 
understanding of the instructions and concepts by performing well on at least the 
first few items). The adapted instruments are described in more detail in the 
Results section. 
 
The test administration in our pilot test was done in a non-standard way (Van de 
Vijver & Tanzer, 2004) in order to evaluate the appropriateness of the test 
materials and test procedure. In this non-standard way, the focus is not primarily 
on the child’s responses to test items, but on identifying the processes behind 
these responses. One test examiner (a trained psychologist) administered KABC-II 
subtests to all children in the pilot. A supervising psychologist (first author) 
observed each of these test administrations. The examiner asked the child to 
repeat the instructions when there was any doubt about whether a child had 
understood the instructions of a particular subtest. The child was asked to explain 
his/her answer choice if an answer had to be selected from various options. Both 
the supervisor and the test examiner evaluated the child’s ability to work with the 
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test materials and the response formats. This supervisor also assessed the skills of 
the test examiner to administer the various adapted subtests. The extensive 
practice ensured that the examiner administered the items in an appropriate way, 




We focused on eight of the core subtests of the KABC-II for 7-12 year-old children. 
The Results section is divided in three parts. The subtests that required a theory-
driven adaptation are presented first (Number Recall and Atlantis), followed by 
the subtests that required a familiarity/recognizability-driven adaptation 
(Triangles, Rover, Pattern Reasoning, and Story completion), and finally the 
subtests that required both types of adaptation (Word Order and Rebus). Each 
subtest is first described (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004), followed by an overview of 
the main modifications. Only those aspects of the adaptation process are described 
here that we expect to be relevant for adaptations of other cognitive tests. 
 
Theory-driven adaptations 
Number Recall (short-term memory). In this task, the child is asked to repeat a 
series of monosyllabic digits (1 to 9, excluding 7) in the same sequence as 
presented by the examiner, with series ranging in length from two to nine digits. 
Number Recall is comparable to Digit Span (forward) from the Wechsler scales. 
According to Baddeley’s phonological loop model (Baddeley, Thomson, & 
Buchanan, 1975; Cowan, Baddeley, Elliott, & Norris, 2003), the number of items 
that can be stored in memory varies with their phonological length (such as the 
number of syllables). The shorter the items, the more items can be recalled. It 
follows from the model that Number Recall will be more sensitive to differences 
in memory capacity when shorter digits are used and that it is important to 





All digits in Kannada from 1 to 9 are bisyllabic, except 2 and 9, which have three 
syllables. We decided to rely as much as possible on the bisyllabic digits in the 
Kannada version. The three-syllabic digits (2 and 9) were only introduced late in 
the test, in series of eight and nine digits.  
 
Atlantis (long-term storage and retrieval). The examiner teaches the child 
nonsense names (here defined as pseudo-words that have a common phonological 
structure) for fanciful pictures of fish, plants, and shells. The child has to point to 
the corresponding picture in an array of pictures when it is named. The test 
measures the ability to memorize new phonological information without the 
support of the meaning or context of the words. A comparable task is Memory for 
Names from the Woodcock-Johnson III tests of cognitive ability (Woodcock, 
McGrew, & Mather, 2001).  
 
The first group of Kannada children (who are not familiar with the English 
language) found it difficult to make distinctions between the English nonsense 
names. Therefore, we replaced the English nonsense names by Kannada nonsense 
names. The sounds of the chosen names were sufficiently distinct for the children 
to easily distinguish between the words. As in the original version, one-, two-, and 
three-syllable names were chosen for fish, plants, and shells, respectively.  
 
Familiarity/recognizability-driven adaptations 
Triangles (visual processing). The child assembles several identical foam 
triangles (blue on one side and yellow on the other) to match a target picture of an 
abstract design. For easier items, the child assembles a set of colorful plastic shapes 
to match a model constructed by the examiner or shown in the test booklet. The 
test is based on Koh’s (1927) Block-Design Test and shows similarities with 
subtests such as Block Design from the Wechsler scales and Pattern Construction 
from the Differential Ability Scales (Elliott, 1990). 
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Subsequent items of Triangles should increase in difficulty, as is the case for all 
KABC-II subtests and for most subtests of other cognitive test batteries. It became 
clear during the pilot test that compliance with this rule required changes in the 
order and nature of some items. The original sample item of the foam triangles 
involves constructing a larger triangle with two smaller ones. This item appeared 
to be too difficult for a sample item. Furthermore, the children in the pilot test 
could solve items relatively well when the triangles in the target figure showed 
left-right symmetry, but items without this left-right symmetry were much more 
difficult for them. This could be the result of their lack of experience with making 
puzzles. We decided to include three items with one triangle in the adapted test so 
that children could explore the possibilities of manipulating a single triangle 
before they had to manage two or more. We also added one easier two-triangle 
item and slightly changed the item order to ensure an increasing level of difficulty 
for the Kannada children.  
 
The original test manual indicates that for most items any rotation of the final 
(total) configuration should be scored as correct. The pilot test showed that 
children sometimes produced solutions with a large rotation relative to the target 
figure, which would have to be scored as correct. However, when the children 
were asked to explain their solution, they did not show full understanding of the 
item. To avoid this problem, we decided that only solutions with a rotation of 45 
degrees or less in either direction from the displayed model would be scored as 
correct.  
 
Part of the Triangles test is timed. Because the local schools do not train their 
children in managing their time and performing quickly while doing exercises or 
tests, we decided to apply a more liberal time limit: the original time limits were 
relaxed by 15 seconds. No extra points were given for quick responses, having only 





Rover (visual processing). The child has to move a dog toy (called Rover) to a 
bone on a checkerboard-like grid that contains obstacles (rocks and weeds) by 
making as few moves as possible. Rover is based on several non-verbal problem-
solving tasks, such as the Tower of Hanoi (Cook, 1937).  
 
When the original Rover dog was used to make the moves, the children tended to 
start the path to the bone in the direction the dog was facing. To prevent this, we 
needed an object that is similar on all sides so that it does not implicitly suggest a 
direction to the child. We replaced the original dog by a pawn, which turned out 
to be well accepted by the children.  
 
Not all children in the pilot test understood which moves Rover was allowed to 
make. To overcome this problem, we adapted one sample item and changed two 
regular test items into sample items to ensure that the child understood the 
principles of the test completely (e.g., regarding diagonal moves and regarding 
some obstacles drawn on the grid, like a rock). Three test items were added to give 
the child the opportunity to show that the principle of the test was understood 
before moving on to the next phase (in which a rock was introduced, which 
should be avoided when moving the dog to the bone). Like in Triangles, the 
original time limits were relaxed by 15 seconds.  
 
Pattern Reasoning (fluid reasoning). The child is shown a series of stimuli that 
form a logical sequence organized according to a pattern that is not explicitly 
provided (e.g., A-B-A-?-A); one stimulus in the series is missing. The child 
completes the pattern by selecting the correct stimulus from an array of four to six 
options at the bottom of the page. Most stimuli are abstract, geometric shapes, and 
some easy items use meaningful pictures. Pattern Reasoning shows similarities 
with the subtest Matrix Reasoning from the WISC-IV (Wechsler, 2004) and with 
Raven’s Standard (Raven, Raven, & Court, 1998b) and Coloured (Raven, Raven, & 
Court, 1998a) Progressive Matrices. 
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Two adaptations were required. First, we slightly changed the administration of 
the second item (a teaching item) where children often appeared to choose the 
correct answer option without understanding the pattern. Some children 
indicated that this was because the correct option is an appealing picture. It was 
therefore decided to explain the correct answer regardless of whether the child’s 
answer was incorrect or correct. Second, the original version requires the 
assessment of response times at item level. We did not monitor time because the 
pilot test showed that accurate measures of the short response times (often only a 
few seconds) were difficult to obtain, leaving only 0 (incorrect) and 1 (correct) as 
possible scores.  
 
Story Completion (fluid reasoning). The child is shown a row of pictures that 
tell a story, but some of the pictures are missing. The child is given a set of 
pictures, selects the ones that are needed to complete the story, and places the 
missing pictures in their correct locations.  
 
The subtest contains many references to cultural aspects that were unfamiliar or 
unknown to our target population (in general or because of their low 
socioeconomic status). Examples are having a birthday party, blowing balloons, 
specific Western dishes, and the use of napkins. We replaced the entire subtest 
(culture-driven adaptation) by our items based on the items of Picture 
Arrangement from the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (Wechsler, 1949, 
1974, 1991). Each item of Picture Arrangement consists of a series of pictures 
depicting a story. The pictures are presented in an incorrect order and the child is 
asked to arrange them in an order that makes a sensible story. Although Picture 
Arrangement seemed to be less related to a specific cultural context, the items 
needed modification.  
 
The WISC Picture Arrangement (Wechsler, 1949) and the WISC-R Picture 
Arrangement (Wechsler, 1974) were each administered to approximately 10 




combined with extensive discussions with the local study team, were our starting 
point for developing the adapted version. New drawings and modifications in 
drawings were made by a local artist. All items were extensively piloted. The 
number of cards in each item was kept similar to the original Wechsler scales 
whenever possible. Five new themes were introduced (two sample items and three 
test items), one item from the original WISC was used, one item from WISC-III 
was used, and eight items of WISC-R were adapted.  
 
There is only one sample item in the original Picture Arrangement task; 
furthermore, the item does not require any active participation of the child. The 
examiner arranges the cards in the correct order, tells the story, and asks the child 
whether he or she understood the item. We decided to include two sample items 
that require active participation of the child. The administrator first puts the cards 
in the correct order and tells the displayed story; the administrator then puts the 
cards in the incorrect order again and asks the child to arrange them in the correct 
order. The child then has to point to each card and tell the story depicted. The 
administrator explains the item further (again) if needed, until the child has 
clearly understood the item. 
 
Stories with a high cultural loading were removed (i.e., items that the children 
could not understand because the concepts expressed or objects displayed in the 
items were not familiar or recognized), items with a lower cultural loading were 
adapted, and some new items were created. The sample item of both the WISC 
and the WISC-R is a three-card item that shows how a lady walks to a scale, takes 
her weight, and walks away. We decided to remove the item because the type of 
scale that is used in the item is unfamiliar to the children in our target sample. An 
example of an adapted item is a four-card item describing a burglar breaking into a 
house and getting caught by the police. The pilot test made clear that Kannada 
children did not recognize the cues in the outfit of the burglar (horizontally black-
and-white striped shirt in combination with a small mask over the eyes). In 
addition, children are not familiar with windows that slide vertically. In the 
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adapted version, the burglar has an Indian appearance and the window has two 













Figure 2.1  
Example of a culturally adapted drawing of Picture Arrangement 
 
Theory-driven and familiarity/recognizability-driven adaptations 
Word Order (short-term memory). The child has to point to a series of 
silhouettes of common objects in the same order as the examiner said the names of 
the objects while they were out of the child’s sight; an interference task (color 
naming) is added between the stimulus and the response for the more difficult 
items. Stimuli of the American version of Word Order were selected carefully to 
ensure that young children with normal language development would readily 
identify and label all pictures in an adequate manner. The American original 
contains only objects with one-syllable names to control phonological length and 
complexity similarly to what was previously observed for Number Recall (theory-
driven adaptation). The test is based on auditory-vocal short-term memory tests, 
in which the child has to repeat a series of unrelated words spoken by the test 
examiner. Word Order is different from these traditional tests in that it does not 




Everyday objects with one-syllable names in Kannada were difficult to find, 
which made it necessary to select everyday objects with bisyllabic names (theory-
driven adaptation). The additional criteria for choosing new stimuli were that 
their names and corresponding visual representation (black-and-white drawings) 
should be unambiguous and highly familiar (familiarity/recognizability-driven 
adaptation). One out of the twelve original stimuli needed redrawing; the drawing 
of a house contained a chimney, which was not known to the Indian children and 
was therefore removed. Six out of the twelve original stimuli needed replacement. 
Drawings of a star, key, hand, moon, heart, and shoe were replaced by drawings of 
a flower, book, leg, sun, chair, and bus, respectively. The goal of the color 
interference task (color naming) is to measure recall following interference. 
Children had problems with naming gray blocks because there is no common 
Kannada word for gray. This problem was avoided by using blocks with more 
familiar colors.  
 
Rebus (long-term storage and retrieval). In this test measuring associative 
memory, (verbal) learning, and long-term storage and retrieval, the examiner 
teaches the child the word or concept associated with each particular drawing, 
and the child “reads” aloud phrases and sentences composed of these drawings 
(e.g., six different drawings can form the sentence “The girl and boy play games”). 
A comparable test is Visual-Auditory Learning from the Woodcock-Johnson III 
(Woodcock et al., 2001). We did not administer Rebus. Translating and adapting 
would have been very difficult in Kannada language. The sentences to be 
produced are so strongly related to the specifics of the local language (such as the 
use of particles and word order in a sentence), that a close (literal) translation was 
not possible and a modification would produce a version that is considerably 
different from the original.  
 
We replaced Rebus by our Verbal Learning Test that is based on the Rey Auditory 
Verbal Learning Test (Rey, 1964) (language-driven adaptation). The Verbal 
Learning Test measures immediate memory, efficiency of learning, and recall after 
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short and long delay periods. Although the nature of this test differs from Rebus in 
that it does not associate verbal labels with visual stimuli (associative memory), 
both tests focus on storing and efficiently retrieving newly learned information.   
 
Our test consists of a list of 15 words. The following criteria were used for 
choosing words in the list: (a) the words are related to children’s everyday 
experience, which ensures high familiarity; (b) the words belong to the same 
grammatical category (e.g., nouns) and refer to concrete objects; (c) the words 
have two syllables; (d) phonological similarities between words in the list are kept 
to a minimum; (e) the words do not belong to the same semantic category (e.g., 
animals or means of transport) in order to prevent clustered recall; (f) the words 
are not used elsewhere in the cognitive test battery. Criterion (a) refers to 
familiarity/recognizability-driven adaptations, whereas criteria (b) to (f) illustrate 
theory-driven adaptations. The list is read to the child out loud at a rate of one 
word per second at a constant tone. Then the child is asked to reproduce all the 
words from the list that can be remembered. This procedure is repeated two times 
and after a 20 minute delay during which two other cognitive tests are 
administered, recall is measured for the fourth time. 
 
Discussion 
Many cognitive tests have been developed in the United States and Europe. If 
these tests are used in a non-Westernized context, various adaptations (involving 
instructions, item formats, response formats, and test stimuli) may be needed to 
ensure their suitability for the new cultural context. Our focus has been entirely 
on judgmental, a priori procedures of the test adaptation process; we did not 
address the adaptation from an a posteriori, statistical point of view. Because no 
agreement exists on minimum standards or best practices for judgmental 
procedures, we proposed and applied a systematic, qualitative approach to adapt 
cognitive tests. Our approach combines two aspects. First, we systematically 
employed iterations of translating, piloting (i.e., cognitive pretesting), and 




cognitive test adaptations we presented. Our approach is illustrated by an 
adaptation of the Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children, second edition 
(KABC-II) for use among 6 to 10-year-old Kannada-speaking children of low 
socioeconomic status in Bangalore, India. The adaptation dealt with cultural, 
linguistic, and socioeconomic differences between the original (American) context 
and the target (Indian) context. Our procedure and findings provide us with 
valuable information that can be generalized to the cross-cultural use of other 
cognitive tests (such as the Wechsler scales) and other settings.  
 
Adaptations of all subtests were needed to maximize the suitability of the 
(American) KABC-II for use in our Indian sample because many subtests showed 
implicit or explicit references to cultural elements. Theory-driven adaptations 
were applied in Number Recall and in Atlantis. Familiarity/recognizability-driven 
adaptations were used in Triangles, Rover, Pattern Reasoning, and Picture 
Arrangement. In Word Order and Verbal Learning Test, both 
familiarity/recognizability-driven adaptations and theory-driven adaptations were 
applied. We can conclude that most adaptations were needed because of problems 
with the familiarity and recognizability of specific tasks (e.g., the subtest Rover) 
and of specific items (e.g., the drawing of a key in the American Word Order). A 
translation of the test without the adaptations is presumably highly susceptible to 
instrument bias (i.e., a form of method bias) and item bias; an inadequately 
adapted instrument is likely to provide an underestimation of the cognitive 
performance of a child.  
 
We introduced a distinction between five types of adaptations that can be used in 
transferring instruments to a new linguistic/cultural context. This categorization 
allows us to draw conclusions on our KABC-II adaptation and on cognitive test 
adaptations in general. First, two types of adaptation were sufficient to reduce the 
cultural unsuitability of the eight selected subtests. The nature of the test clearly 
determines the types of adaptation needed. For instance, language-driven 
adaptations may be more relevant for questionnaires or for predominantly verbal 
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cognitive tests (e.g., WISC subtests like Vocabulary and Similarities) that measure 
crystallized abilities. Some core KABC-II subtests measure these abilities (Riddles 
and Verbal Knowledge); however, we did not include these because of their 
presumed high cultural loading. Culture-driven adaptations may be more relevant 
for subtests such as the Comprehension (WISC), in which questions are asked that 
refer to social situations and conventions.  
 
Second, familiarity/recognizability-driven adaptations were more laborious than 
theory-driven adaptations; the former assume thorough cultural knowledge (local 
people were our cultural informants), these adaptations can often take many forms 
and require a choice out of many candidate solutions, and these adaptations 
require elaborate piloting to evaluate the success of (each successive version of) 
the adaptation. Theory-driven adaptations, on the other hand, are more 
straightforward and less susceptible to disagreement, because the underlying 
principles are widely investigated and documented. As a result, smaller pilot 
samples and fewer iterations (only one or two) were needed to modify subtests 
that required theory-driven adaptations (such as Number Recall) than the 
familiarity/recognizability-driven adaptations (at least four or five) before an 
acceptable level of linguistic/cultural suitability was reached. An additional reason 
for the relative ease of performing theory-driven adaptations is that the abilities 
measured by those subtests (memory and learning) are very familiar to children 
that are frequently addressed by a teaching technique based on rote learning.  
 
What are the implications of our adaptation procedure for the use and adaptation 
of other instruments in a non-Westernized context? First, many adaptations were 
needed for the KABC-II, indicating the necessity to closely inspect all Western 
instruments that are to be used or were already used outside their culture of origin 
for possible sources of bias. Second, some of our adaptations were more general 
and would presumably apply to various non-Westernized contexts whereas other 
adaptations seem to be more culture-specific. The addition of test instructions and 




universally relevant (and especially relevant for children without assessment 
experience). On the other hand, the results of theory-driven and 
familiarity/recognizability-driven adaptations are specific for a particular culture 
and may therefore not be universally applicable. Third, we would like to stress the 
importance of paying attention to the cultural loading of tests with non-verbal 
stimuli, in particular when there are large differences between the cultures of the 
test developer and the participants. As opposed to verbal tests with culture-related 
stimuli (e.g., reading tasks, spelling tasks, the WISC subtest Comprehension), tests 
with non-verbal stimuli are often considered to travel well across cultures due to 
their limited emphasis on language (Ortiz & Dynda, 2005); however, non-verbal 
tests are not “culture-free” (cf. Helms-Lorenz, Van de Vijver, & Poortinga, 2003). 
Fourth, familiarity/recognizability driven adaptations do not merely entail 
changes in the content of the items; they can also focus on response formats (e.g., 
children in some contexts are not used to working with multiple choice response 
formats), and on the order in which items are presented if an increase in item 
difficulty is required. Finally, our study points to the crucial importance of 
combining various fields of expertise in the adaptation process. Linguistic, 
psychometric, and cultural knowledge should be combined to successfully adapt 
an instrument; in the case of this particular adaptation, knowledge on cognitive 
theories and child psychology were combined with linguistic and cultural 
expertise. We would specifically like to emphasize the need to work with cultural 
informants. Our adaptation involved local study collaborators (some had an 
expertise in psychology, others were experts in the local language) as well as the 
people who were most directly involved with children in our target population, 
such as parents (to provide information on the child’s cognitive stimulation at 
home) and teachers (to provide information on the school curricula and teaching 
strategies) An adequate test adaptation requires extensive observations of the 
children’s natural home and school environment, including child raising and 
teaching methods.  
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Our focus has been entirely on a priori procedures of the test adaptation process. 
Obviously, studies of the adequacy (validity) of adaptations should be 
complemented by statistical, a posteriori evidence (through data collection and 
data analysis). After data have been collected with an adapted instrument, various 
statistical procedures need to be employed to examine to what extent the original 
goals of developing an appropriate test have been accomplished. The questions 
need to be addressed of whether the adapted subtests constitute reliable and valid 
measures. In short, the data collection provides the litmus test of the adequacy of 
the adaptation (see Chapter 3). An elaborate, detailed, and systematic test 
adaptation in our view constitutes a first, important, and strongly recommended 






Traveling With Cognitive Tests: 
Testing the Validity of a KABC-II Adaptation in India2 
 
Many tests that originate from the U.S. or Europe have been used extensively in 
developing and emerging countries without practically and scientifically 
examining the suitability of these instruments outside of their country or culture 
of origin (Misra, Sahoo, & Puhan, 1997). The use of the original or closely 
translated instruments saves costs and time; yet, optimizing an instrument for a 
specific cultural context implies the need for an adaptation, in which cultural 
knowledge, values, and practices are taken into account (see Abubakar et al., 2007; 
Holding et al., 2004). A close translation may then not be sufficient. The validity 
of adapted instruments cannot be inferred from the original Western instruments 
and has to be demonstrated in the new cultural context. Adaptations of the 
Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children (K-ABC; A. S. Kaufman & Kaufman, 
1983) have been described before (e.g., Holding et al., 2004; Moon, McLean, & 
Kaufman, 2003); however, its successor, the Kaufman Assessment Battery for 
Children, second edition (KABC-II), which differs from the first version in several 
ways (see A. S. Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004), has not been adapted. The KABC-II is 
an individually administered measure of cognitive ability that can be used for 
children from 3 to 18 years of age. It measures long-term storage and retrieval, 
short-term memory, visual processing, fluid reasoning, and crystallized ability. In 
a previous report we described the extensive adaptation of the KABC-II for use 
among 6- to 10-year-old Kannada-speaking children of low socioeconomic status 
in Bangalore, South India (Chapter 2). The present study statistically tested the 
adequacy of the resulting instrument by examining its reliability and validity.    
 
                                                   
2 This chapter is based on Malda, Van de Vijver, Srinivasan, Transler, & Sukumar (in 
press) 
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Quality criteria 
The use of Western cognitive instruments in non-Western contexts may lead to 
bias, which refers to factors that make direct comparisons of test constructs or 
scores between groups invalid (e.g., Van de Vijver & Tanzer, 2004). Bias makes 
culture-fair testing impossible (Verney, Granholm, Marshall, Malcarne, & 
Saccuzzo, 2005). Instrument adaptation has been proposed as a strategy to reduce 
bias, optimize the suitability of an instrument for a cultural context, and facilitate 
cross-cultural test transfer (e.g., Van de Vijver & Poortinga, 2005). A properly 
adapted cognitive instrument meets both qualitative and quantitative criteria.  
 
The main qualitative criteria involve cultural and linguistic appropriateness of the 
instrument in the target context. The judgmental procedures that were applied to 
meet these criteria in the Indian adaptation of the KABC-II were described before 
(see Chapter 2). Quantitative criteria to assess the quality of an adaptation include 
the instrument’s reliability and validity. Various criteria have been proposed for 
demonstrating the construct validity of an instrument (Messick, 1989). In the 
absence of cross-cultural comparative data, our validity test was based on three 
criteria that examine whether theoretical expectations are borne out. First, the 
underlying theoretical model should be well represented in the data; second, 
relations of test scores with background characteristics such as children’s age and 
sex should be according to expectations; thirdly, relations of test scores with 
presumably related psychological constructs (such as scholastic achievement) 
should be according to expectations. The current study tested whether the adapted 
version of the KABC-II meets these three criteria that are described below in more 
detail. Other criteria for construct validity, such as a test’s predictive validity, 
were not addressed.  
 
Generalizability of cognitive structure. The KABC-II is based on the 
Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) model of cognitive abilities (A. S. Kaufman & 
Kaufman, 2004; see also Reynolds, Keith, Goldenring-Fine, Fisher, & Low, 2007). 
The CHC theory integrates the Cattell-Horn Gf-Gc theory (distinguishing 
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between various fluid and crystallized cognitive abilities) and Carroll’s three-
stratum theory (Carroll, 1993; McGrew, 2005). The construct validity of our 
adaptation is statistically supported if our Indian data confirm the original CHC 
structure, assuming that the model can be generalized to non-Western groups. 
The generalizability of the CHC model has been shown with exploratory as well as 
confirmatory factor analyses across age (Bickley, Keith, & Wolfle, 1995; Taub & 
McGrew, 2004) and sex (Reynolds, Keith, Ridley, & Patel, 2008). Furthermore, the 
CHC structure is found with many cognitive test batteries even when these were 
not originally designed to represent this structure (for an overview see McGrew, 
2005). Is the CHC model, besides being generalizable across ages, sexes, and tests, 
also generalizable across cultures?  
 
Models underlying cognitive test batteries have shown cross-cultural stability 
(Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 2002; Irvine, 1979; Van de Vijver, 1997). A 
large study was conducted with culturally adapted versions of the WISC-III 
(Georgas, Van de Vijver, Weiss, & Saklofske, 2003). Using exploratory factor 
analyses, it was found that the cross-cultural equivalence of the underlying 
structure was high. The K-ABC (the predecessor of the KABC-II), based on the 
sequential versus simultaneous processing distinction, was applied in many non-
Western countries (e.g., Boivin et al., 1996; Conant et al., 1999; Jansen & Greenop, 
2008; Mardell-Czudnowski, 1995). Holding et al. (2004) and Moon et al. (2003) 
found the underlying model to be present in adapted versions in Kenya and Korea, 
respectively. Not many studies on the CHC model have been conducted in non-
Western contexts; still, there is no reason to doubt the universality of the structure 
of a well-established cognitive model. We consider the CHC model to be a good 
starting point for statistically evaluating the validity of our KABC-II adaptation.  
 
Age and sex effects. Test scores are expected to increase with age in our study 
sample. Although there tends to be considerable overlap between male and female 
cognitive test score distributions (Born, Bleichrodt, & Van der Flier, 1987; 
Fairweather, 1976), males generally score higher on tests measuring visual abilities 
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and mathematical reasoning, whereas females do better on verbal (memory) tasks 
and numerical calculation (e.g., Reynolds et al., 2008). Sex differences on the 
original KABC-II are small for school-age children (7 to 18 years); boys perform 
better on the visual processing tasks and girls on the learning and fluid reasoning 
tasks (A. S. Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004).  
 
Relations with school performance: Arithmetic. Various mechanisms 
behind the positive relation between cognitive abilities and arithmetic skills in 
middle childhood have been proposed, such as phonological and/or visuospatial 
memory, speed of processing, number processing, and spatial and non-verbal 
ability (Durand, Hulme, Larkin, & Snowling, 2005). The mechanisms are likely to 
vary across ages and tasks. Correlations between broad ability factors of the 
original KABC-II and arithmetic scores of other cognitive batteries (A. S. Kaufman 
& Kaufman, 2004) show that for the younger age group (grades 2-5) the highest 
correlations were found for the fluid reasoning factor, possibly because arithmetic 
processes are not yet differentiated and automated, and hence, their solution still 




Our study adds to the literature in that it 1) evaluates the validity of an adaptation 
of the relatively new KABC-II in a non-Western context; and 2) examines the 
CHC model in this non-Western (Indian) context to accomplish this. As a 
prerequisite for any hypothesis testing in a research context (rather than a clinical 
context), the internal consistencies of the subtests should be at least .70 (Cicchetti 
et al., 2006). The appropriateness of our adaptation is tested using the following 
hypotheses: 
• Theoretical structure 
1. The factor structure of the KABC-II adaptation is in line 
with the CHC model; 
• Psychometric properties 
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2. The underlying cognitive structure is similar across sexes 
(2a) and ages (2b); 
3. Test scores increase significantly with age; 
4. If sex differences in scores are found, boys outperform 
girls on visual processing tasks, and girls outperform boys 
on fluid reasoning and learning tasks;  
5. All broad ability factors correlate significantly with 
arithmetic scores;  
6. Arithmetic scores show the highest correlations with the 
fluid reasoning factor. 
 
Method 
Participants and study context 
The sample included 598 Kannada-speaking children (293 boys and 305 girls) of 
low socioeconomic status in Bangalore (state of Karnataka, South India). The 
children were between 6 and 10 years old (M = 8.71, SD = 1.17) and from grade 
two to five of two primary schools (N = 370 and N = 228, respectively).  
 
The children in our sample came from families with an average monthly income 
of 2700 Indian Rupees (56 USD). Many adults were illiterate or had only a few 
years of education. Houses were crowded; most had one or two rooms, and the 
average number of people in a household was 5.81 (2.71 adults and 3.11 children). 
Children had very few toys to play with and very limited access to books. Rote 
learning was widely used in the schools of the study; it is a commonly applied 
method in Indian education (Mishra, 1997), which is well applicable with large 
numbers of children and with a collectivistic style of teaching because the 
children do not need to be addressed individually. 
 
Instruments 
Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children, Second Edition. An adapted 
version of eight core subtests of the KABC-II was administered; a description of 
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the extensive adaptation procedure can be found in Chapter 2. Here, we confine 
ourselves to describing the abilities measured (see also Carroll, 1993; A. S. 
Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004; J. C. Kaufman, Kaufman, Kaufman-Singer, & 
Kaufman, 2005; McGrew, 2005). Two subtests were selected to assess the broad 
ability of fluid reasoning; Pattern Reasoning measures inductive reasoning and 
visualization, and our Indian version of WISC/-R/-III Picture Arrangement 
(which is a replacement of the KABC-II subtest Story Completion) mainly 
measures pattern recognition, reasoning, and planning (Wechsler, 1949, 1974, 
1991). Two subtests were selected to cover the broad ability factor of short-term 
memory, namely Number Recall and Word Order, both measuring memory span. 
The subtests Rover and Triangles were assumed to reflect the broad ability of 
visual processing. Rover is a measure of spatial scanning, general sequential or 
deductive reasoning, and math achievement; Triangles measures spatial relations 
and visualization. For the broad ability factor of long-term storage and retrieval, 
Atlantis was selected which is a measure of associative memory. The second test 
was an auditory Verbal Learning Test, which was a replacement of the KABC-II 
subtest Rebus. In this study we use the recall score of the Verbal Learning Test: 
the number of words (out of 15) correctly recalled after a 20 minute delay. For the 
purposes of the larger study to which our study contributes, another subtest that is 
not part of the KABC-II battery was added, namely Verbal Fluency (a measure of 
associational fluency). This addition aimed to ensure proper coverage of long-term 
storage and retrieval processes. Also, two subtests reflecting the broad ability of 
cognitive speediness were included, namely Coding B and Number Cancellation; 
cognitive speediness was not covered by the core subtests of the KABC-II but is 
part of the CHC model. Coding B is taken from the Wechsler scales and is 
(mainly) a measure of attention and concentration; Number Cancellation measures 
perceptual speed, and more specifically scanning (McGrew, 2005). 
 
Arithmetic test. Measures of crystallized abilities and school achievement (such 
as reading, spelling, and arithmetic tasks) provide an external validation criterion 
for our adapted test. The only available local test of school achievement that 
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seemed sensitive enough to discriminate between children within the same school 
grade, was the Arithmetic Diagnostic Test for Primary School Children (Ramaa, 
1994). We based our arithmetic test on this instrument and on information about 
the curriculum of the schools included in the current study. A test consisting of 
two parts was composed; 36 addition and 34 subtraction items of increasing 
difficulty. The sum score of these two parts was used in the analyses. 
 
Procedure 
All children and their parents gave consent for participation in the study, in 
accordance with Indian ethical rules. Seven test examiners were trained jointly by 
a Dutch psychologist (first author) and a local psychologist (fifth author), after 
which the study commenced. Each test examiner assessed two children every day; 
the administration was split up in three test sessions (two sessions of 30 minutes 
and one of 45 minutes). All administered the tests to more or less the same 
number of girls and boys and to children of all grades. The arithmetic test was 
administered to batches of about 60 children who had all received KABC-II testing 
in the same week.  
 
Analyses 
First, reliabilities were calculated by the split-half technique, Cronbach’s alpha, or 
correlations, depending on the characteristics of the subtests. Second, structural 
equation modeling in Amos 6 (Arbuckle, 2005) was used to test the validity of the 
CHC model for the study sample (hypothesis 1), followed by multigroup analyses 
to test for equivalence of the model across sexes (hypothesis 2a) and ages 
(hypothesis 2b). Multivariate Analyses of Variance (MANOVAs) were conducted 
to test for the effects of age (hypothesis 3) and sex (hypothesis 4) on cognitive test 
scores. Last, hypotheses 5 and 6 (dealing with the arithmetic test) were addressed 








For the subtests Atlantis, Rover, Number Recall, Pattern Reasoning, Word Order, 
Triangles, and Picture Arrangement, the internal consistency was measured by the 
split-half technique. Values of Cronbach’s alpha could not be computed due to the 
discontinuation rules of these subtests. For each subtest, the sum scores of the odd 
and even items were correlated and the Spearman-Brown formula (Thurstone, 
1931) was applied to adjust this reliability estimate for test length. Reliabilities of 
our adapted subtests were acceptable to very good (Pattern Reasoning: .94; Picture 
Arrangement: .72; Number Recall: .70; Word Order: .82; Triangles: .89; Rover: .90; 
Atlantis: .96) and largely in accordance with the reliabilities of the original KABC-
II.  
 
The Verbal Learning Test comprised a 15-word list that was read out loud to the 
child, after which immediate recall was measured. This procedure was repeated 
twice and after a 20 minute delay, recall was measured for the fourth time. 
Cronbach’s alpha was calculated for the number of correctly recalled words in 
each of these four trials; the median alpha across the five age groups (i.e., ages 6 to 
10) was high: .84 (range .75 - .86). In further analyses we only used the recall score 
of the Verbal Learning Test (i.e., number of correctly recalled words after a 20 
minute delay).  
 
For Verbal Fluency, Number Cancellation, and Coding B, an indication of 
reliability could only be obtained by item or test correlations because these tests 
consist of one or two items. All correlations were controlled for age. The Verbal 
Fluency test first required the children to call out as many animals as possible, and 
then as many first names as possible. The correlation between the two numbers 
was positive and significant (r(598) = .31, p < .01), according to our expectations. 
The value was not very high, presumably because most children named their 
classmates one by one when they generated first names, but they did not use a 
common strategy in generating animal names. The correlation between Number 
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Cancellation time and Coding B was r(598) = -.45 (p < .01), indicating that the 
faster the child finished the Number Cancellation task, the more correct items 
were obtained on Coding B.  
 
Validity 
CHC model. Structural equation modeling was used to test the validity of the 
CHC model. The subtests (i.e., specific abilities) were expected to cover five broad 
abilities, namely fluid reasoning, short-term memory, visual processing, long-term 
storage and retrieval, and cognitive speediness. A general cognitive ability factor 
(called Mental Processing Index for the KABC-II) was expected to underlie these 
five factors. The fit of the original CHC model (model 1) to our data was 
acceptable, however, the modification indices suggested two improvements: 1) 
linking Verbal Fluency to the cognitive speediness factor rather than the long-
term storage and retrieval factor (because Verbal Fluency also involves speed), and 
2) combining the visual processing subtests with the fluid reasoning subtests in 
one factor (because all these subtests involve aspects of reasoning). We tested the 
first alternative (model 2), then the second alternative (model 3), followed by a 
combination of the two (model 4). Fit statistics are presented in Table 3.1.  
 
Table 3.1 
Summary statistics for various structural equation models related to the CHC model 
Model χ2 df χ2/df p CFI RMSEA AIC 
1. CHC 122.711 39 3.146 .001 .941 .060 176.711 
2. VF to CS 124.312 39 3.187 .001 .940 .061 178.312 
3. VP with FR 103.792 40 2.595 .001 .955 .052 155.792 
4. Vf to CS and  
    VP with FR 
111.406 40 2.785 .001 .950 .055 163.406 
Note. Preferred model is printed in italics. CHC = Cattell-Horn-Carroll, Vf = Verbal 
Fluency, CS = Cognitive Speediness, VP = Visual Processing, FR = Fluid Reasoning, 
CFI = Comparative Fit Index, RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation, 
AIC = Akaike’s Information Criterion. 
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Differences between the fit of the models were small, however, Table 3.1 suggests 
that model 3 showed a slightly better fit than the other models (particularly given 
its relatively low AIC value). Model 3 is displayed in Figure 3.1. 
 
There is considerable overlap between the structures of the CHC model and our 
model; most importantly, the hierarchy of cognitive abilities is supported. Most 
expected factors were found: a short-term memory factor, a long-term storage and 
retrieval factor, and a cognitive speediness factor. Our final model differed from 
the CHC model in two ways. First, Triangles and Rover, hypothesized to represent 
a separate visual processing factor, loaded on the same factor as Pattern Reasoning 
and Picture Arrangement. Second, the patterning of the loadings of the broad 
abilities on general cognitive functioning is different from the CHC model. This 
model would predict that fluid reasoning has the highest loading on the general 
cognitive factor, followed by short-term memory, long-term storage and retrieval, 
and cognitive speediness. However, the long-term storage and retrieval factor 
showed the highest loading in our study, followed by fluid reasoning, short-term 
memory, and cognitive speediness. We estimated the confidence intervals of the 
factor loadings using a bootstrapping procedure and found that the confidence 
interval of the long-term storage and retrieval loading did not overlap with the 
confidence intervals of the other loadings. This indicated that only the long-term 
storage and retrieval loading differed significantly from the others (p < .05). 
 
Sex and age. Multigroup analysis was applied to test for equivalence of our final 
model across sexes and ages. Sex and age could not be combined in one single 
multigroup analysis because the children were not equally distributed across all 
possible combinations of sex and age; therefore, we tested multigroup invariance 
of the CHC model separately for these two variables. A good fit was found for a 
model in which all parameters were constrained to be equal for boys and girls 
(χ2[106, N = 598] = 213.64, p < .01, χ2/df = 2.02, GFI = .94, AGFI = .93, TLI = .95, 






























Note. Standardized coefficients. The model is standardized for age. MPI = Mental 
Processing Index. 
 
Figure 3.1  
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The model testing the invariance across age groups (age groups 6 and 7 are taken 
together due to the relatively small number of children with age 6) showed a good 
fit when all parameters were identical, except for equality of measurement 
residuals (χ2[205, N = 598] = 298.58, p < .01, χ2/df = 1.46, GFI = .92, AGFI = .89, 
TLI = .93, CFI = .94, RMSEA = .03). Widaman and Reise (1997) argue that the 
latter constraint is rather irrelevant.  
 
A MANOVA was computed with sex (Wilks’ Lambda = .88, F[11, 578] = 7.23, p < 
.01, partial η2 = .12) and age group (Wilks’ Lambda = .57, F[44, 2213.24] = 8.05, p < 
.01, partial η2 = .13) as independent variables and the sum scores for all cognitive 
tests as dependent variables. There was no significant interaction between sex and 
age group (Wilks’ Lambda = .92, F[44, 2213.24] = 1.10, p = .31, partial η2 = .02). 
Girls scored significantly higher than boys on Verbal Learning recall (F[1, 588] = 
18.82, p < .01, d = .42), Number Cancellation time (F[1, 588] = 36.04, p < .01, d = 
-.47), Coding (F[1, 588] = 13.90, p < .01, d = .38), and Verbal Fluency (F[1, 588] = 
8.34, p < .01, d = .30). Boys outperformed girls on Rover (F[1, 588] = 5.31, p < .05, 
d = -.18). Scores on all subtests increased significantly with age (p < .01). Age 
explained more variance on the subtests measuring fluid reasoning and cognitive 
speediness as compared to the subtests measuring short-term memory and 
retrieval ability. For example, for Rover, partial η2 was .17 (F(4, 588) = 30.61, p < 
.01) whereas for Number Recall, the value was .04, F(4, 588) = 6.05, p < .01. These 
findings indicate that children’s reasoning and speed abilities are more age 
dependent than the other abilities.  
 
Arithmetic test. The reliability of the arithmetic test was very high; the median 
value of Cronbach’s alpha for the five age groups was .95 (range .93 - .96). The 
sum scores on the arithmetic test correlated significantly with the broad ability 
factors (with r(598) ranging from .37 to .49, p < .01) and the Mental Processing 
Index (r(598) = .61, p < .01). The correlation was significantly lower (tested using 
procedures described by Dunn & Clark, 1969) for cognitive speediness than for all 
other factors (the difference between the cognitive speediness and short-term 
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memory factor was bordering on significance). Arithmetic scores did not show the 




The KABC-II was extensively adapted for 6 to 10-year-old Kannada-speaking 
children of low socioeconomic status in Bangalore, South India (Chapter 2). The 
current study statistically evaluated the adequacy of our adaptation. Most 
hypotheses were confirmed. The adapted subtests showed high reliabilities; the 
cognitive CHC model underlying the original KABC-II was largely replicated 
(hypothesis 1); the CHC model was valid across sexes (2a) and age groups (2b); 
cognitive test scores increased with age (3); the small sex differences in some of 
the subtest scores were in line with expectations (4); the arithmetic test correlated 
significantly with all broad ability factors (5); the arithmetic sum score showed 
similar correlations with all but one of the broad ability factors (not confirming 
hypothesis 6, which predicted a higher correlation with fluid reasoning). We can 
conclude that our adaptation of the KABC-II is a valid cognitive measure for the 
target sample. This is an important finding in light of the prevalence of bias in 
applications of Western cognitive instruments in a non-Western context.  
 
Our final model differed from the CHC model in two ways. First, Triangles and 
Rover, hypothesized to represent a separate visual processing factor, loaded on the 
same factor as Pattern Reasoning and Picture Arrangement. These four subtests 
were among the subtests with the highest intercorrelations (varying from .33 to 
.48, p < .01). This finding most probably relates to a combination of the nature of 
the tasks (all are figural) and their complexity; fluid abilities usually depend on an 
integration of many distinct cognitive abilities whereas visual processing abilities 
require fewer cognitive resources. However, since both the stimulus mode and the 
response mode of our visual processing tasks were very unfamiliar to the Indian 
children (despite the test adaptations that were performed to increase familiarity 
and suitability), it stands to reason that Triangles and Rover reflect fluid reasoning 
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abilities rather than merely visual processing. Training children on various 
cognitive tasks could reduce the cognitive complexity and cause a better 
differentiation between tests (and factors) and a smaller reliance on a more general 
cognitive ability.  
 
Second, the patterning of the loadings of the broad abilities on general cognitive 
functioning is different from the CHC model. Only the loading of the long-term 
storage and retrieval factor differed significantly from the others. The limited 
differentiation between the loadings may, again, be a consequence of the task 
unfamiliarity. The high loading of the long-term storage and retrieval factor may 
be caused by the diversity of the subtests that belong to this factor. The factor 
consists of tests that tap a wide range of abilities, in addition to their common 
factor. The Verbal Learning Test is a test of short- and long-term memory and 
learning, whereas Verbal Fluency measures free recall, and Atlantis adds a strong 
visual component (besides its memory and learning aspects). Because together 
these tests measure a broad range of abilities, it is not surprising that the loading of 
the long-term storage and retrieval factor on the Mental Processing Index (MPI, 
reflecting general cognitive functioning) is so high. The CHC model might have 
been replicated more closely, if we had included all (instead of merely the core) 
subtests of the KABC-II, providing a better coverage of the broad ability factors. 
Adding subtests would however have led to prohibitively long test administration 
times for our study sample. 
 
Familiarity could also play a role in explaining the lack of differentiation in 
correlations between the broad ability factors and the arithmetic score. In the 
introduction we suggested that arithmetic processes might not yet be 
differentiated and automated for young children, and hence, their solution still 
requires complex, integrated cognitive abilities. This suggestion is in line with our 
expectation of a higher correlation between the arithmetic score and the 
(cognitively complex) fluid reasoning factor. Our findings, however, show that the 
arithmetic score correlates similarly to all but one of the broad ability factors 
Chapter 3 
 57 
(cognitive speediness), which might indicate that the arithmetic test measures an 
even more cognitively complex ability in our sample than anticipated. The high 
correlation with the MPI (.61) confirms the relevance of general cognitive 
processes in arithmetic performance, possibly due to the unfamiliarity of the 
sample with such tests and test situations. 
 
The task unfamiliarity that we observed in our sample shows the profound 
influence of both home environment and educational characteristics on cognitive 
test performance. These Indian children of low socioeconomic status are provided 
with suboptimal stimulation (few play materials) at home and the educational 
system is mainly focused on collective rote learning, which explains the child’s 
lack of experience with individual test situations, and with materials such as 
puzzles and (geometrical) figures. This implies that issues with testing in non-
Western contexts could be related to differences in socioeconomic status, in 
addition to cultural differences. It is possible that a sample of children from the 
same geographic area and same language but with high socioeconomic status 
would have shown a closer match with the original CHC structure compared to 
our present sample.  
 
The combination of the evidence obtained in the qualitative adaptation process of 
the KABC-II (Chapter 2) and the quantitative process discussed here, supports the 
suitability and validity of our adaptation for Kannada-speaking children of low 
socioeconomic status in India; the current study offers further evidence for the 
generalizability of the CHC model in developing, non-Westernized countries. 
Both the qualitative and quantitative parts are prerequisites for ensuring an 
instrument’s adequacy. Many studies omit a detailed test adaptation, which could 
lead to the use of culturally inappropriate stimuli. However, the current study 
shows that after an extensive qualitative adaptation process, quantitative analyses 
are needed to demonstrate its success. Cognitive data can only be interpreted 
validly when the tests meet both judgmental (qualitative) and statistical 







Stimulation in the Home Positively Relates to  
Children’s Cognitive Performance in Bangalore, India3 
 
Numerous studies have addressed the relation between poverty and children’s 
developmental outcomes (see Bradley & Corwyn, 2002; Brooks-Gunn & Duncan, 
1997); yet, studies of the pathways underlying this relation were mainly 
conducted in the United States (Bradley & Corwyn, 2002; Davis-Kean, 2005; Guo 
& Harris, 2000; Lugo-Gil & Tamis-LeMonda, 2008; Yeung, Linver, & Brooks-
Gunn, 2002). To what extent are Western models on the structure and strength of 
relations between variables in the home environment and developmental outcome 
variables generalizable across countries or cultural groups? Relations between 
these variables can differ across groups for various reasons (Bradley et al., 1989; 
McLoyd, 1998), such as sample characteristics (e.g., different socioeconomic 
circumstances), cultural aspects (e.g., different norms or parenting practices), and 
measurement features (e.g., cultural bias in the assessment instruments). Cross-
cultural differences in (the strength of) these relations could point to differences 
in factors that are critical for developmental outcomes. Specific targets for 
interventions fostering child development might therefore be dependent on the 
cultural context. The present study tests the applicability of Western findings on 
environment-cognition relations in a non-Western context. This is done by 
examining which variables in the home environment are associated with the 
cognitive performance of children of low socioeconomic status (SES) in Bangalore 
(South India) as well as possible pathways underlying this relation. 
 
Conceptual framework of the present study 
The study starts from an integration of two Western models that have been 
proposed to examine relations between SES (indicators) and developmental 
                                                   
3 This chapter is based on Malda, Van de Vijver, Srinivasan, Transler, & Sukumar 
(2009) 
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outcomes of children: the investment model and the family stress model (Guo & 
Harris, 2000; Yeung et al., 2002). The investment model holds that if more 
financial resources are used to invest in children, children will have access to 
more materials and activities that can enhance their cognitive performance. The 
family process or family stress model (Conger et al., 2002) can be seen as an 
extension of the investment model. The model relates low income to material 
hardship and resultant parental stress, which can affect child development 
through the family climate and parental behaviors. In short, the investment model 
focuses on a family’s material resources, whereas the family stress model focuses 
more on psychological resources; both types of resources can affect a child’s 
cognitive outcomes. The variables included in these models vary over studies. We 
combine the two models in the current study by including a core selection of 
variables that reflect both material and psychological resources, namely SES, asset 
indicators (i.e., housing conditions and goods), psychological functioning of the 
primary caregiver, social support, family conflict, and parental behaviors. Figure 













Figure 4.1  















In line with other developmental models (e.g., Bronfenbrenner, 1979), we 
distinguish variables that are proximal from variables that are distal to a child’s 
cognitive outcome. The variables displayed in Figure 4.1 can be viewed as varying 
on this proximal-distal dimension. According to this perspective, developmental 
outcomes are associated with a hierarchically organized network of variables that 
range from SES as most distal, with a general influence, to parental behaviors as 
most proximal, with a focused influence. Going from left to right in Figure 4.1, the 
variables become more proximal to the child’s cognitive performance. Crucial in 
the model is the mediating role of more proximal variables in the association 
between more distal variables and child outcome. The effect of the distal variable 
SES on outcome is “unpackaged” (Whiting, 1976) into effects mediated by more 
proximal variables.  
 
The next section describes the relations between these variables in more detail 
and, where necessary, explains their relevance for the Indian context. The 
empirical studies were performed with Western samples unless specified 
otherwise.  
 
Relevant distal and proximal variables in an Indian context  
SES is usually seen as a variable with a distal influence on developmental 
outcomes and in many studies represents variables such as parental occupation, 
education, and income (McLoyd, 1998). Housing conditions and household goods 
(i.e., asset indicators) are used as more concrete indicators of a family’s SES (Filmer 
& Pritchett, 2001). More indirect (Gershoff, Aber, Raver, & Lennon, 2007; Guo & 
Harris, 2000; Krishnakumar & Black, 2002; Yeung et al., 2002) than direct 
(Duncan, Brooks-Gunn, & Klebanov, 1994; Krishnakumar & Black, 2002) relations 
have been found between (indicators of) SES and cognitive outcomes. Direct links 
were reported between socioeconomic variables and material hardship (Gershoff 
et al., 2007), maternal stress (Evans, Boxhill, & Pinkava, 2008), quality of the home 
environment (Krishnakumar & Black, 2002), and the physical home environment 
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or cognitively stimulating materials and activities (Gershoff et al., 2007; Guo & 
Harris, 2000; Yeung et al., 2002).  
 
Maternal psychosocial characteristics can affect the interaction between mother 
and child (Nair & Radhakrishnan, 2004; Petterson & Albers, 2001). Poor 
psychosocial functioning of the mother, possibly resulting from economic 
hardship, could lead to poor responsiveness (Evans et al., 2008) or poor provision 
of stimulation to the child (Baker-Henningham, Powell, Walker, & Grantham-
McGregor, 2003), which in turn could negatively affect the child’s cognitive 
outcome.  
 
Social support refers to “any process through which social relationships might 
promote health and well-being” (Cohen, Gottlieb, & Underwood, 2000, p. 4) and 
is considered very important in the Indian context, where sharing of worries, 
living space, and food are common and valued practices (Pandey, 2006). Increased 
support can reduce parental stress, thereby positively affecting nurturing and 
parenting (McLoyd, 1990; Pascoe & Earp, 1984). Mother’s social network has been 
linked to her responsiveness (Evans et al., 2008), stimulation in the home 
(Adamakos et al., 1986; Baker-Henningham et al., 2003), and structuring of the 
child’s environment (Adamakos et al., 1986).  
 
Economic hardship can lead to family conflict which in turn can add to disruptive 
parenting practices with negative consequences for children (Conger et al., 2002). 
Domestic violence is highly prevalent in India (International Institute for 
Population Sciences [IIPS] and ORC Macro, 2000). Studies from India also report a 
high prevalence of alcohol abuse in urban slums (D. Mohan, Chopra, Ray, & Sethi, 
2000; D. Mohan, Desai, Chopra, & Sethi, 1992; I. Mohan, 1998), with particular 
impact on the family in terms of neglect and domestic violence (Gaunekar, Patel, 
& Rane, 2005). A relation between maternal alcohol use and the quality of the 
home environment was also found among African American children 
(Krishnakumar & Black, 2002). 
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Parenting can mediate between environmental factors and child outcome (Lugo-
Gil & Tamis-LeMonda, 2008; McLoyd, 1998). Parents’ use of cognitively 
stimulating materials and activities has been linked to the child’s cognitive skills 
(Gershoff et al., 2007). Various versions of the Home Observation and 
Measurement of the Environment (HOME) Inventory (Caldwell & Bradley, 1984, 
2003) correlated with children’s academic performance in both Western and non-
Western cultures (Bradley, Corwyn, & Whiteside-Mansell, 1996). Bradley and 
Corwyn (2005) indicated that three parenting aspects seem positively related to 
child development in every context, namely 1) warmth and responsiveness; 2) 
stimulation/teaching; 3) discipline/control. Parenting practices are influenced by 
socioeconomic background and culture; as a consequence, the specific parental 
behaviors that represent these three aspects can differ across and within contexts 
(Bradley & Corwyn, 2005; Harkness & Super, 2002).  
 
Cross-cultural differences in warmth and responsiveness toward children can be 
found in behaviors such as praising, the public expression of affection, and 
spontaneous verbal interactions; for example, many Indian children are not 
allowed to speak without permission, resulting in few spontaneous verbal 
interactions (Bradley & Corwyn, 2005). Differences in stimulating and teaching 
involve both type and quantity. Many parents from Western, industrialized 
societies emphasize the importance of their children’s cognitive development and 
the role of cognitively stimulating toys and materials (Bradley & Corwyn, 2005), 
whereas many Indian parents highly value their children’s social skills, such as 
being helpful, respectful, and obedient (Saraswathi & Dutta, 1988; Sinha, 1988; 
Srivastava & Misra, 2001). 
 
Low income families more often demonstrate an authoritarian parenting style and 
use physical disciplining to correct a child’s behavior (Magnuson & Duncan, 
2002). Studies from India report that parents are restrictive and hierarchical in 
their parenting and often resort to such physical disciplining (Hunter, Jain, 
Sadowski, & Sanhueza, 2000); however, the effects of this style on the (affective, 
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cognitive, and behavioral) development of the child may not be negative, as is 
often assumed in Western countries (Chao & Tseng, 2002). A controversy exists 
over the effects of physical discipline on these child outcomes (Gershoff, 2002; 
Lansford et al., 2005). We do not refer here to harsh punishment and abuse, that 
will presumably have a universally negative relation with child outcome, but to 
mild disciplining. The inconsistency of findings on its effects could probably be 
resolved by taking into account the prevailing cultural norms about parental 
behavior. What could be seen as punishment and as having negative effects on 
child outcome by Western standards might be viewed as regular disciplining and 
as having a non-negative effect in India.   
 
The present study 
Figure 4.1 shows all the possible pathways from the described environmental 
factors to cognitive outcome. We expect the structure of the model to hold across 
cultures; yet, both the (non-) significance and strength of pathways may vary 
cross-culturally. By studying the applicability of our hypothesized model for our 
target sample of 6- to 10-year-old children of low SES in Bangalore (India), we can 
determine whether Western findings on environment-cognition relations 
generalize to this non-Western context, examine the differential roles of proximal 
and distal factors, and inform local interventions about critical environmental 
factors in an Indian context.  
 
Method 
Participants and study context 
The sample consisted of 532 primary caregivers of at least one school-going child 
between 6 and 10 years old from Bangalore, South India (M = 8.70, SD = 1.17). 
Ninety-four percent of the interviewed caregivers were the mothers; the other six 
percent were grandmothers or other female relatives. Their mean age was 31.55 




Families had an average monthly income of 2700 Indian Rupees (56 USD). Many 
were illiterate (46% of the primary caregivers and 39% of the fathers) or had a 
maximum of five years of education (66% and 57%, respectively). Occupational 
levels were low: 65% of primary caregivers and 40% of fathers were unskilled 
workers (e.g., housemaid, helper, or manual laborer); 49% of fathers were skilled 
workers (e.g., carpenter, tailor, or painter). The father was absent in 13% of the 
families. The physical home environment was characterized by high levels of 
crowding; houses mostly had one or two rooms, and the average number of people 
in a household was 5.85 (SD = 1.89, min. = 2, max. = 19): 2.72 adults (SD = 1.22) 
and 3.13 (SD = 1.19) children. The main source of lighting was electricity. Most 
people made use of a public water tap and had their own toilet or shared a flush 
toilet with a few households. Children had very few toys to play with and had 
very limited access to books.  
 
Instruments 
Most of the instruments that were used in the current study needed adaptation to 
obtain a valid measure of the target constructs. Details on this process are given 
when necessary. After each instrument description, we report the internal 
consistency reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) and the percentage of explained 
variance for the first factor extracted with principal component analyses. Evidence 
was found for the unidimensionality of all instruments. Some instruments 
employed response scales that were not the same for all items; therefore, scores 
were standardized for each item to compute total scores. For each (scale of each) 
instrument, the average z score across its items was used in further analyses.  
 
Socioeconomic Status and Asset Indicators Questionnaire. The family’s 
SES was derived from three questions addressing the highest level of education in 
the household (six categories, ranging from illiterate to graduate), the highest level 
of current occupation in the household (six categories, ranging from unemployed 
to semi-professional), and income, respectively. Correlations between these 
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variables ranged from .11 to .25 (p < .05). Alpha was .40. The first factor explained 
46% of the variance. 
 
We assessed the family’s housing conditions and goods (i.e., asset indicators) with 
one item on crowding (i.e., the number of rooms per person living in the house, 
reverse keyed) and five items from the Standard of Living Index (International 
Institute for Population Sciences (IIPS) and ORC Macro, 2000), namely the type of 
house (pucca, semi-pucca, or kutcha; pucca houses are completely made out of 
brick and concrete; semi-pucca have fewer of these materials; kutcha houses are 
made of mud and have thatched roofs), size of the house (kitchen in a separate 
room or not), type of fuel used for cooking, type of toilet facility, and the 
availability of household goods (such as electric fan and fridge). Correlations 
between these variables ranged from .15 to .41 (p < .01). Alpha was .39. The first 
factor explained 46% of the variance. 
 
General Health Questionnaire. The General Health Questionnaire 
(Goldberg, 1978) is a measure of current mental health that has been widely 
applied in cross-cultural studies (Goldberg et al., 1997). The GHQ-12 is a 
shortened version of the General Health Questionnaire and its application as a 
screening tool in research settings is well documented. The GHQ-12 is commonly 
used in India to detect general psychological distress (see, for example, Pothen, 
Kuruvilla, Philip, Joseph, & Jacob, 2003); an existing Kannada translation of the 
instrument (Sriram, Chandrashekar, Isaac, & Shanmugham, 1989) was used in the 
present study as a measure of psychological functioning of the primary caregiver. 
An example of an item is “Have you recently lost much sleep over worry?”. There 
were four answer options (0 = not at all; 1 = no more than usual; 2 = rather more 
than usual; 3 = much more than usual). Scores were recoded so that higher scores 
indicated a higher level of general mental health. Alpha was .82. The first factor 




Social Support Questionnaire. The items of our measure of social support 
were based on and adapted from existing questionnaires and example items given 
in articles and book chapters (see, for example, Wills & Shinar, 2000). Social 
support takes different forms, namely emotional, instrumental, informational, and 
appraisal (Tardy, 1985). Our final version resulted from an intensive procedure of 
translating, piloting, and adapting (see Procedure), and consisted of 12 items: 6 
reflected informational or instrumental support (e.g., “Do you feel there are 
enough people in your environment that would lend or give you something you 
need, like food, clothing, or money?”), and 6 reflected emotional support or 
appraisal (e.g., “Do you feel there are enough people that can comfort you when 
you feel unhappy about your daily life?”), with answer options ranging from 
definitely not enough (1) to definitely enough (4). Alpha was .88. The first factor 
explained 43% of the variance. 
 
Family Conflict Questionnaire. Three items were selected from the Kannada 
version of the Family Environment Scale (Moos, Insel, & Humphrey, 1974) to 
assess household risk factors. The items were: “Are there a lot of fights (i.e., 
arguments) in your family?”, “Do family members sometimes get so angry they 
throw things?”, and “Do family members sometimes hit each other?” Each 
question could be answered by yes (= 1) or no (= 0). Given the high prevalence of 
alcohol abuse and related domestic violence, we added an item on alcohol (ab)use 
with two dependent parts: “Does anybody in the family drink alcohol?”, (if yes:) 
“Does this cause any disturbance at home (e.g., shouting, violence)?”. These two 
parts were combined into one single item with three answer options (i.e., no 
alcohol use; alcohol use but this does not cause disturbance; alcohol use which 
causes disturbance). Alpha was .79. The first factor explained 62% of the variance. 
 
Middle Childhood HOME Inventory. The Home Observation for 
Measurement of the Environment (HOME) Inventory (Caldwell & Bradley, 1984, 
2003) was developed to measure the quality and quantity of stimulation and 
support available to a child in the home environment. We used the Middle 
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Childhood HOME (59 items), designed for children between 6 and 10 years old. 
Because our study sample was of low SES and also differed substantially in culture 
from the American norm sample, the instrument needed extensive adaptation. 
Some items were not appropriate given the low SES context, such as “Family 
member has taken child to a scientific, historical, or art museum within the past 
year”. Other items showed no variance in our relatively homogeneous sample, 
such as “The interior of the home is not dark or perceptually monotonous”. These 
items were removed from the list. Some items were adapted so as to introduce 
variability and avoid floor effects; for example, we changed the item “Child has 
free access to at least ten appropriate books” to “Child has free access to children’s 
books”. Also, some items were added that were deemed appropriate in our Indian 
sample and could be related to developmental outcomes, such as items related to 
disciplining the child. The original version contains one item on physical 
punishment. Because disciplining the child is very common in our sample and can 
take different forms, we elaborated on this topic by using the question “How do 
you discipline your child?”. Parents had to indicate whether or not and if so, how 
many times in the past two weeks, they applied 1) verbal disciplining (shouting, 
scolding); 2) verbal disciplining (discussions); 3) physical disciplining. Finally, the 
items in which the interaction between caregiver and child is directly observed 
were not used. We collected our data during the day, and in most of the cases the 
children were at school, making a direct observation of the child-caregiver 
interaction impossible. Our adapted instrument consisted of 24 items. 
 
In line with Krishnakumar and Black’s (2002) suggestion, we aimed to distinguish 
between clusters of parenting behaviors that might have differential effects on 
cognitive performance. However, since the adaptation only contained 24 items, 
the eight subscales of the original HOME were not properly covered. The 
dimensions of warmth, discipline, and stimulation that Bradley and Corwyn 
(2005) described could not be fully covered because the category of warmth was 
not well-presented due to the lack of items that required direct caregiver-child 
interaction. A Disciplining subscale of four items was made; an example of an item 
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is “How many times in the last two weeks have you verbally disciplined your child 
by shouting or scolding?”. For the remaining 20 HOME items that reflect 
stimulation, we applied a distinction that is in line with our conceptual model of 
distal and proximal variables (see Figure 4.1); the items were split into a proximal 
subscale of Direct Involvement subscale and a distal subscale of Indirect 
Involvement.  
 
The Direct Involvement subscale contained 10 proximal items reflecting direct 
involvement with the child, by providing structure (e.g., “Does your family have a 
regular and predictable program every day for the child?”) and by providing direct 
stimulation (e.g., “Do you encourage your child to read on his/her own?”). The 
Indirect Involvement subscale consisted of 10 (more distal) items reflecting more 
indirect involvement with the child, by providing an enriching climate. There 
were items related to family companionship and items related to activities with 
the children (e.g., “How often has the family member taken the child to some type 
of live performance or a celebration within the past year?”), and items related to 
indirect cognitive stimulation (e.g., “On how many days a week does the child 
have contact with friends outside school hours?”, and “On how many days a week 
does one or do both parents watch/hear/read the news on 
television/radio/newspaper?”).  
 
Most items could be answered by yes (= 1) or no (= 0). If necessary, items were 
recoded so that a higher score reflected more stimulation. For some items the 
answer was a frequency (e.g., “How many times a month does the family visit 
relatives or friends or do relatives or friends visit the family?”). A cut-off point was 
determined based on the variance in the data; all frequency items were 
dichotomized, distinguishing a frequency of zero (recoded into no = 0) from 
higher frequencies (recoded into yes = 1). Alpha values were .54 for the 
Disciplining scale, .48 for the Direct Involvement scale, and .48 for the Indirect 
Involvement scale. The first factor explained 48%, 19%, and 22% of the variance, 
respectively. 
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Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children, Second Edition (KABC-II). 
The KABC-II is an individually administered measure of cognitive ability that can 
be used for children from 3 to 18 years of age (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004). Eight 
KABC-II subtests were selected and three other subtests were added. The 
adaptations and validation procedure of the adapted subtests are described 
elsewhere (Chapter 2; Chapter 3). A general cognitive score was calculated by 
averaging the age-standardized sum scores for each of the four scales underlying 
the cognitive battery (i.e., fluid reasoning, short-term memory, long-term storage 
and retrieval ability, and cognitive speediness). This score was used in the present 
study as an index of the child’s cognitive performance. Alpha was .86. The first 
factor explained 61% of the variance. 
 
Procedure 
Adaptation and pilot phase. Kannada translations of the GHQ-12 and of the 
items composing our Family Conflict Questionnaire were already available. A 
pilot study confirmed their ecological appropriateness. To ensure the 
appropriateness of the constructed Social Support Questionnaire and of the 
adapted HOME Inventory, we applied an iterative procedure of translating, 
piloting, and adapting the test items. All items were first translated by a team of 
psychologists and independently back translated by a psychologist not involved in 
the project. Linguistic and cultural appropriateness were checked by performing a 
pilot study, in which the interviewed caregivers provided feedback on the clarity 
and relevance of the items, and could give suggestions for inclusion of additional 
items. Changes were implemented if necessary, the translation was adjusted 
accordingly, and the new version was piloted again until an appropriate 
instrument was obtained. Eighteen caregivers were interviewed to obtain the final 
version.  
 
Data collection phase. Two research assistants interviewed the primary 
caregivers at their children’s school to record demographic and socioeconomic 
information. Two social workers who were fluent in both English and Kannada 
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were intensively trained by a local psychologist (the fifth author) to administer 
the other questionnaires to the primary caregivers. The trainer joined each social 
worker for 10 interviews at the start of data collection to determine the inter-rater 
reliability. Average intraclass correlations (absolute agreement) between the 
trainer’s and the social workers’ scoring were very high: .887 for the GHQ-12, 
.957 for the Social Support Questionnaire, 1.000 for the Family Conflict 
Questionnaire, and .996 for the HOME Inventory. On average, each social worker 
then administered the questionnaires to three caregivers a day at their homes and 
each interview session took about 45 minutes. More than 95% of the interviews 
were administered in Kannada, the remainder in Tamil.  
 
Results 
First, some findings on the more proximal variables in the home environment are 
described. Second, the link between the home environment and children’s 
cognitive performance is analyzed by structural equation modeling (Arbuckle, 
2005).  
 
Descriptives for proximal variables  
We take a closer look at the more proximal variables reflecting the family climate 
(i.e., general mental health, social support, and family conflict) and parental 
behaviors. To give an indication of the general mental health of the primary 
caregivers, their average item score on the GHQ-12 was examined. This score was 
1.93 on a scale of 0 to 3, indicating an on average good state of self-reported 
mental health. Unlike what we would expect in a low SES urban sample, the score 
distribution of GHQ-12 did not show any overrepresentation of caregivers with 
major psychological distress; on the contrary, the distribution was negatively 
skewed (z = -9.41, p < .01). The average item score on the Social Support 
Questionnaire was 2.73 on a scale of 1 to 4, indicating sufficient perceived social 
support. Family conflicts were common; about half of the primary caregivers 
reported many verbal arguments in their families, 40% reported incidents of 
physical violence. Half of the primary caregivers reported alcohol use of a family 
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member, and in 70% of those cases this caused disturbance at home, such as 
shouting or violence.  
 
An analysis of the HOME Inventory items showed that about 75% of primary 
caregivers reported praising their child and 80% encouraged their child to read; 
yet, about 90% of the children did not have access to books besides their school 
books, and many parents could not read with them because they were illiterate. 
Almost half of the children did not have contact with friends after school hours. 
More than half of the parents took their child to a live performance or celebration 
at least once a year (on most occasions the event was a wedding). Around 90% of 
primary caregivers reported regularly losing temper with their children, 74% 
reported shouting at them, 66% used verbal discussions and around 80% used 
physical disciplining. The HOME Inventory showed that caregivers were highly 
involved, paying both positive and negative attention to their children. 
 
Home environment and cognitive performance 
Table 4.1 presents the bivariate correlations between all questionnaires and 
cognitive performance. SES and asset indicators significantly related to all 
variables except the disciplining items from the HOME, emphasizing the broad 
network of associations of SES. Family climate variables (i.e., general mental 
health, social support, and family conflict) related to all parental behaviors (direct 
involvement, indirect involvement, and disciplining), with the exception of 
general mental health, which was not related to the direct involvement with the 
child. Disciplining the child was related to the family climate variables but not to 
the other parental behaviors of direct and indirect involvement and not to 
cognitive performance. Direct involvement with the child was the only proximal 
variable that correlated significantly with cognitive outcome.  
 
Path analysis was used to test the fit of the model displayed in Figure 4.1 to the 
data. All possible relations between all variables were included, except for one so 




Bivariate correlations among all questionnaires and cognitive performance 
 SES AI GHQ SS FC H-D H-I H-Dis CP 
SES .67         
Asset Indicators .36** .62        
GHQ-12 .09* .15** .58       
Social Support .15** .18** .37** .65      
Family Conflict -.09* -.21** -.27** -.22** .78     
HOME-Direct .11** .15** .06 .13** -.14** .42    
HOME-Indirect .23** .28** .19** .23** -.19** .21** .42   
HOME-Disciplining .02 -.03 -.11** -.11* .18** -.01 -.00 .69  
Cognitive Performance .11* .09* .07 .01 -.02 .21** .07 .01 .65 
Note. SES = Socioeconomic Status, AI = Asset Indicators, GHQ = General Health Questionnaire, SS = Social Support, FC = Family 
Conflict, H-D = HOME-Direct, H-I = HOME-Indirect, H-Dis = HOME-Disciplining, HOME = Home Observation for Measurement  
of the Environment, CP = Cognitive Performance.  
Standard deviations are given on the diagonal. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. 
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between SES and the Disciplining scale was not included; we did not expect 
income and educational or occupational level to be directly related to disciplining 
the child). The model had an excellent fit (χ2[1, N = 532] = 1.23, p = .27, χ2/df = 
1.23, GFI = 1.00, AGFI = .98, TLI = .98, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .02, AIC = 89.23); 
however, many pathways were not significant. Figure 4.2 displays the model in 
which only the significant pathways were retained. The fit (χ2[21, N = 532] = 
26.95, p = .17, χ2/df = 1.28, GFI = .99, AGFI = .98, TLI = .97, CFI = .98, RMSEA = 
.02, AIC = 74.95) was not significantly different from the fit of the first model 
(∆χ2[20, N = 532] = 25.72, p = .18). The model in Figure 4.2 matched the 
hypothesized model in that the relations between the distal environmental 
variables (SES and asset indicators) and cognitive outcome were mediated by the 
proximal environmental factors (family climate and parental behaviors). SES was 
only directly related to asset indicators, social support and the indirect 
involvement with the child. SES was only related to the child’s cognitive outcome 
through the family’s asset indicators, the family climate and the involvement with 
the child. The general mental health of the primary caregiver did not show any 
direct association with parental behaviors; family climate was related to the 
parents’ indirect involvement with the child through perceived social support and 
family conflict and to the parents’ direct involvement through family conflict. 
Only the most proximal scale, the direct involvement of parents with their 
children through structure and stimulation, was directly and significantly related 
to the cognitive score. All indirect effects were significant (p < .05).  
 
The percentages of explained variance for all variables in this model show that the 
effects were small to medium despite being significant: small for social support 
(4%), family conflict (8%), direct involvement (5%), and disciplining (3%), and 
medium for asset indicators (13%), general mental health (17%), and indirect 
























Note. Standardized coefficients. Cognitive performance is standardized for age. 
All depicted parameter estimates are significant, p < .05. 
 
Figure 4.2  
The model relating home environment to cognitive performance in Bangalore, India 
 
Discussion 
Most studies describing the relations between children’s home environment and 
cognitive outcomes have been done in the United States. We were interested in 
studying the generalizability of findings on these relations to a non-Western 
setting and examined which environmental variables contributed to the cognitive 
performance of 6- to 10-year-old school-going children of low SES in Bangalore, 
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suggested by the investment and family stress model. The hypothesized distinction 
between distal and proximal variables was confirmed in that more distal variables 
were at least partly linked to cognitive outcomes through more proximal variables.  
In line with the investment model, SES (an indicator of potential investment in 
the child) and asset indicators (i.e., housing conditions and goods, which are 
concrete indicators of investment) were associated with cognitive outcome, but 
merely through parental behaviors, notably the parents’ direct involvement with 
the child (i.e., the most proximal parental behaviors, such as applying rules, 
encouraging the child to read, and encouraging self-care routines). This means 
that having the financial resources to invest in living conditions and household 
goods and to invest in cognitively stimulating materials and activities is related to 
child outcome. The family stress model was supported by showing that the family 
climate (i.e., general mental health and perceived social support of the primary 
caregiver, and family conflict) was related to the asset indicators; the stress 
accompanying poverty and the availability of few goods could negatively affect 
the family climate. The associations between family climate and a child’s cognitive 
performance were fully mediated by the parents’ direct involvement with the 
child. Experimental or longitudinal studies would be needed to confirm the causal 
nature of the relations in Figure 4.2. 
 
What can be concluded about the adequacy of the proximal-distal distinction 
underlying both the investment and the family stress model as presented in Figure 
4.1? First, the findings confirmed the hypothesized structure of the relations 
between the variables. Second, the proximal-distal distinction proved useful both 
to describe how SES is related to cognitive outcome via mediating variables and to 
split up the items of the HOME Inventory. Differential relations with cognitive 
performance were found for the more distal and more proximal aspects of parental 
behaviors. The correlation between the proximal Direct Involvement subscale and 
cognitive performance (.21) was significant, whereas the correlation of the more 
distal Indirect Involvement subscale (.07) was nonsignificant. The correlation 
between the (proximal) Disciplining subscale (.01) and outcome was, however, 
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also nonsignificant. Disciplining usually has stronger relations with a child’s 
social-emotional than cognitive functioning (Paolucci & Violato, 2004). The 
correlation between the HOME Inventory as a whole (without distinguishing 
subscales) and cognitive performance was .13. Splitting the scale into distal and 
proximal subscales provided us with more specific information as to which 
parental behaviors contributed more to cognitive outcome. This differential 
pattern of correlations provides additional support for the relevance of the 
distinction between proximal and distal aspects in environment-cognition 
relations.  
 
The last conclusion involves the salience of the statistical associations observed, by 
examining 1) the significance of pathways, 2) the strength of significant pathways, 
and 3) the percentage(s) of explained variance. First, many pathways of the 
conceptual framework as depicted in Figure 4.1 were not significant in our sample. 
As explained in the introduction, Figure 4.1 shows all possible pathways between 
the environmental variables and cognitive outcome; different pathways might be 
significant for different samples. With our sample we found proximal variables 
fully mediating the association between distal variables and outcome; hardly any 
factors in the home environment of the child were directly associated with 
cognitive performance. This finding implicates that the association between SES 
and the child’s cognitive outcome, which was significant, could be successfully 
“unpackaged” by the mediating variables; SES is not the critical variable in this 
sample in determining cognitive outcome, but SES can be psychologically 
interpreted as a proxy for psychological processes, such as direct parental 
involvement, that are related to cognitive outcome. Second, the significant 
correlations and standardized regression coefficients in our model were generally 
equal to the values reported in literature on Western sample, however, some were 
lower. For example, beta values for the relation between SES variables and 
cognitively stimulating materials or activities range from .13 to .51 in the 
literature (Gershoff et al., 2007; Guo & Harris, 2000; Yeung et al., 2002). Our 
values were at the lower end of this range. The same holds for the relation 
Stimulation in the Home 
78 
between cognitive stimulating materials or activities and cognitive skills, with 
correlations in the literature ranging from .20 to .60 (see Bradley et al., 1996). 
Also, standardized regression coefficients of indirect associations between SES and 
cognitive outcome ranged from .02 to .30 in previous research (Gershoff et al., 
2007; Guo & Harris, 2000; Krishnakumar & Black, 2002; Yeung et al., 2002). 
Third, with just one (significant) direct and many indirect pathways between 
home environment and cognitive performance, only 4% of the variance in 
cognitive performance could be explained. Divergent findings have been reported 
in the literature, with values roughly ranging from 4 to 40% (Bradley et al., 1996; 
Gershoff et al., 2007; Guo & Harris, 2000; Yeung et al., 2002). 
 
The low values of some of the regression coefficients and the modest amount of 
variance explained in cognitive outcomes deserve closer scrutiny. More 
specifically, the question should be addressed whether these values are a valid 
reflection of the associations in this cultural context or whether they are due to 
limitations of our study. The first reason for some weak associations is the relative 
homogeneity of our sample. Involving families with a higher SES would 
presumably increase the amount of variance explained. Second, the explained 
variance might have also increased by including other child variables such as 
nutritional status and health (Walker et al., 2007). Also, of the three microsystems 
affecting a school-age child (i.e., home, school, and peers; Bronfenbrenner, 1979), 
we have now only included the home environment.  
 
A third factor contributing to the low values could be the low internal consistency 
reliabilities of some instruments. Questionnaires to assess SES and asset indicators 
were short, possibly explaining their low Cronbach’s alpha values. The low 
internal consistencies of the adapted HOME Inventory subscales might be due to a 
combination of the homogeneity of our sample and the relatively small numbers 
of items in each scale. Also, parents obtained different patterns of scores on the 
Direct Involvement subscale; some parents scored high on certain items while 
other parents scored high on others. This implies that it does not matter what kind 
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of stimulation is given to obtain a positive relation with cognitive outcome, as long 
as there is sufficient stimulation. The dissimilar patterns of scores across caregivers 
could have contributed to the low alpha value.  
 
The possible low content validity of the adapted HOME Inventory is a fourth 
factor; did the HOME adaptation actually cover the parental behaviors that are 
important for children’s cognitive outcome in an Indian context? Our adaptation 
was carefully made, together with local informants, and we argue that it is 
doubtful whether a further adaptation would increase the reliability and content 
validity, and thereby the relation with cognitive performance. The internal 
consistency and ecological validity of our measures might be boosted by 
interviewing multiple caregivers instead of merely the primary caregiver, given 
that many Indian children live in extended families where responsibilities for 
child care are shared.  
 
Fifth, the relation between the home environment and developmental outcomes is 
usually stronger for younger children than for children in middle childhood, 
because the latter are exposed to a greater degree of external influences (e.g., 
school, peers) than merely the home environment (Bradley et al., 1996). Many of 
the studies that report correlations between the HOME and cognitive outcome as 
high as .60 deal with infants or children in early childhood. Sixth, the primary 
caregivers in the present study might view cognitive stimulation as part of the 
(cognitive) education that takes place at school; perhaps they do not see 
themselves as playing a role in the cognitive development of their child. Parents of 
low SES generally believe to have less control over their children’s development 
than parents of higher SES (Hoff, Laursen, & Tardif, 2002). Last, parents’ 
expectations might play a role. The lower the SES, the higher Indian parents tend 
to value children’s social skills as compared to cognitive skills (Srivastava & Misra, 
2001).  
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It can be concluded that by increasing the internal consistency of some measures, 
the amount of variance in cognitive outcome that is explained by our predictors 
might have increased somewhat; yet, there are also strong reasons to believe that 
the link between SES, parenting, and cognitive outcome is not very strong in this 
Indian context and adding new samples or measures would not have altered the 
modest role of the variables in the present study.  
 
The primary caregivers in the present study generally reported an unexpectedly 
good state of mental health, as manifested in the relatively high mean score level 
on the GHQ-12. The question formulation of the GHQ might have played a part 
in this finding. The instrument asks about certain feelings or experiences relative 
to “usual” feelings or experiences. As a result, the GHQ is more sensitive to detect 
short-term psychological distress than to detect chronic distress (Goodchild & 
Duncan-Jones, 1985). For example, when people are already under constant strain 
(as could be the case in our sample of low SES), they could answer the question 
“Have you recently felt under strain?” with no more than usual. This would be an 
indication of good mental health according to the GHQ scoring, but on an 
absolute level, these people could be under significant strain. The GHQ might not 
provide adequate information on the interviewee’s baseline level of mental health. 
An inaccurate representation of the general mental health of the primary 
caregiver could have caused the absence of a direct relation with parental 
behaviors in the path model of the present study. 
 
Even with a homogeneous sample we have found support for the relative 
importance of proximal and distal variables. How can the present study inform 
interventions aimed at fostering child development? The relations between SES 
and outcomes are mostly indirect and it will probably take a long time for positive 
changes in SES (by educating caregivers or by an increase in family income) to 
bring about positive changes in outcome. Our study suggests that influencing 
parental behavior towards greater involvement with the child is critical for 
cognitive performance. It is much more (cost) effective and feasible on a short-
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term to increase caregivers’ awareness of how they themselves can directly affect 
developmental outcomes by being involved with their child through providing 







Rugby Versus Soccer in South Africa: Content Familiarity 
Explains Most Cross-Cultural Differences in  
Cognitive Test Scores4 
 
Cross-cultural differences in cognitive test scores are not well understood. Where 
do they come from and why are they larger for some tests than for others? 
Spearman’s Hypothesis (SH) relates these cross-cultural differences to the 
cognitive complexity of tests; differences are larger for tests with a higher 
cognitive complexity (Jensen, 1985, 1998). SH attributes this pattern to cross-
cultural differences in the underlying general cognitive ability on which tests with 
a higher cognitive complexity more strongly rely. However, a test’s cognitive 
complexity is often confounded with its cultural complexity, and the latter may 
largely explain cross-cultural score differences (Helms-Lorenz, Van de Vijver, & 
Poortinga, 2003). A test’s cultural complexity (referred to as “cultural loading” in 
Chapter 2) refers to the specific cultural knowledge that is required to perform 
well on this test, such as declarative and procedural knowledge that is shared in a 
particular culture. The cultural complexity of a test is reflected in a group’s 
familiarity with the type of test and with the content of the test. In order to 
disentangle the influence of cultural and cognitive complexity on test 
performance, the present study examines the effect of content familiarity on the 
performance on tests of different cognitive complexity. More specifically, we 
address the role of content familiarity in tests measuring (the cognitively complex 
ability of) fluid reasoning and tests measuring (the less complex, though related 
abilities of) short-term memory, attention, and working memory (Carroll, 1993; 
McGrew, 2005). For each of these tests, two test versions were developed in which 
the content familiarity of the items was maximized for either Afrikaans-speaking 
or Setswana-speaking school-age children in South Africa. Both versions were 
administered to children of both groups.  
                                                   
4 This chapter is based on Malda, Van de Vijver, & Temane (2009) 
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Cultural complexity 
Successful performance on a test with a high cultural complexity requires specific 
cultural knowledge. This knowledge is stored in a semantic network in memory, 
which can be viewed as a system of nodes (cultural elements) with links 
(associations) between them. This network is comparable to the system of 
cognitive elements required for cognitive skill acquisition (see Anderson, 1982). 
For people who are familiar with the culture in which a test is developed, this 
semantic network has a well defined structure of strong and weak links, which 
means that relevant associations are readily made between the content of the test 
and their knowledge. This facilitates successful completion of the test. People from 
a different culture do not have this well developed semantic network associated 
with the content of this particular test, because they may not know the cultural 
elements or their associations; as a consequence, they have difficulty to perform 
well. The level of cultural complexity of a test then refers to the extent to which 
an elaborate and automated semantic network of cultural information is required 
to perform well. Cultural complexity is conceptualized in the present study as the 
extent to which test content (i.e., words, drawings) is more familiar to one of the 
compared groups. 
 
Cognitive abilities in the present study 
Short-term memory is described as “the ability to apprehend and maintain 
awareness of elements of information in the immediate situation” (McGrew, 2005, 
p. 153). Controlled attention is defined as “the capacity to maintain and hold 
relevant information in the face of interference or distraction” (Swanson, 2008, p. 
582). Working memory is “a system for the simultaneous processing and storage of 
information” (Oberauer, Süß, Schulze, Wilhelm, & Wittmann, 2000, p. 1018). The 
assignment of attention to the contents of short-term memory creates working 
memory (Schweizer & Moosbrugger, 2004; Swanson, 2008). Fluid reasoning is 
defined as “the use of deliberate and controlled mental operations to solve novel, 
‘on-the-spot’ problems (i.e., tasks that cannot be performed automatically)” 
(McGrew, 2005, p. 151).  
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Some researchers state that short-term memory and working memory cannot be 
differentiated in children (Hutton & Towse, 2001); however, others have shown 
that they are already distinguishable from six years of age (Gathercole, Pickering, 
Ambridge, & Wearing, 2004; Swanson, 2008). Working memory capacity and fluid 
reasoning are strongly related (Süß, Oberauer, Wittmann, Wilhelm, & Schulze, 
2002), though distinguishable (Ackerman, Beier, & Boyle, 2005). Conway, Cowan, 
Bunting, Therriault, and Minkoff (2002) indicated that rather complex tasks such 
as working memory tasks do not rely on automated routines, similar to fluid 
reasoning tasks. Working memory and reasoning tasks share a demand for 
controlled attention. Both working memory and attention play a role in fluid 
reasoning (Unsworth & Engle, 2005); they have a direct relationship with fluid 
reasoning and the relation between attention and fluid reasoning is mediated by 
working memory as well (Schweizer & Moosbrugger, 2004). The cognitive 
structure underlying fluid reasoning abilities that is compatible with these 
findings is shown in Figure 5.1. Short-term memory and attention have both 
direct and indirect relations with fluid reasoning. Working memory plays a 
mediating role. Going from left to right in Figure 5.1, the cognitive abilities 
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Cognitive versus cultural complexity 
Only small cross-cultural differences have been found in attention and short-term 
memory, larger differences in working memory, and the largest differences have 
been reported in fluid reasoning. How can this patterning be explained? One 
explanation, known as Spearman’s Hypothesis (SH), holds that tasks with a higher 
cognitive complexity show larger cross-cultural score differences, mainly because 
of assumed cross-cultural differences in the underlying general cognitive ability 
on which high cognitively complex tests strongly rely (Jensen, 1985, 1998). Fluid 
reasoning tasks produce the largest cross-cultural differences because of their large 
cognitive complexity when compared to attention, short-term memory, and 
working memory tasks (Carroll, 1993). Jensen has conducted many studies that 
supported SH (reviews can be found in Jensen, 1985, 1998). A number of other 
studies also found support for SH (e.g., Hartmann, Kruuse, & Nyborg, 2007; Lynn 
& Owen, 1994; Te Nijenhuis & Van der Flier, 1997).  
 
SH has met with both statistical and conceptual criticism. Statistical analyses 
employed to test the hypothesis have been questioned. Multigroup confirmatory 
factor analysis has been proposed as a statistically more rigorous procedure for 
testing SH than Jensen’s method of correlated vectors; a re-analysis of two data 
sets that were supportive of SH when analyzed by Jensen’s method failed to meet 
basic requirements of cross-cultural comparability in a multigroup confirmatory 
factor analysis (see Dolan, Roorda, & Wicherts, 2004). There are substantive 
reasons to doubt the importance of cognitive complexity in explaining cross-
cultural score differences. Affluence and socioeconomic status have been found to 
explain a large part of cross-cultural score differences through educational 
differences (Van de Vijver, 1997). The content of a test or the medium in which a 
test is administered has also been shown to determine how well a child performs. 
Serpell (1979) tested the perceptual skills of British and Zambian children by 
administering similar tasks in different media. British children performed better 
on paper and pencil tasks whereas the Zambian children performed better on 
wire-modelling tasks. Carraher, Carraher, and Schliemann (1985) found that 
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Brazilian school-going children performed better on arithmetic tasks when they 
were presented in the form of a problem (as in an everyday market situation) than 
when they were presented as numerical calculations (as in school). The 
explanation of cross-cultural score differences that we test in the current study 
holds that cognitive complexity is usually confounded with cultural complexity, 
and that the latter is the actual factor explaining most of the cross-cultural score 
differences (Helms-Lorenz et al., 2003). We label this explanation the Cultural 
Complexity Hypothesis (CCH). Tests that address simple information processing 
usually show less cultural bias than tests addressing complex information 
processing (Vock & Holling, 2008). The former tests, measuring abilities such as 
attention and short-term memory, do not employ complex cultural information 
and hence, they are not very sensitive to group (and individual) differences in 
access to cultural information. Cross-cultural differences on these tests are 
expected to be small. The differences are larger on cognitively more complex 
processes, such as working memory, and will be largest on the most complex tasks, 
such as fluid reasoning tasks, which often require extensive cultural information 
to solve them.  
 
Present study and hypotheses 
A test was constructed for each of the abilities of Figure 5.1. There were two 
versions of each test. One version contained items with a relatively higher content 
familiarity for the Afrikaans-speaking (“Afrikaans”) than for the Setswana-
speaking (“Tswana”) children, labeled the Afrikaans test version. The other 
contained items with a relatively higher content familiarity for the Tswana than 
for the Afrikaans children, labeled the Tswana version. The study involved both 
urban and rural Tswana children, who differed in their exposure to Afrikaans 
culture (with urban children being more exposed than rural children) and to more 
traditional Tswana culture (with rural children being more exposed than urban 
children). Differences in test scores between the Afrikaans and Tswana children 
are expected to be due to the content familiarity of the tests. Four groups of 
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hypotheses are tested. The first group involves the overall patterning of the 
results, as can be derived from both CCH and SH: 
1. The underlying cognitive structure as displayed in Figure 5.1 is a) valid for the 
overall sample; b) invariant across test versions (i.e., Afrikaans and Tswana 
versions); c) invariant across groups (i.e., Afrikaans, urban Tswana, and rural 
Tswana children). 
2. Going from left to right in Figure 5.1, score differences (between groups for 
each test version and between test versions for each group) are expected to 
increase. Small or no group and version differences are expected for attention 
and short-term memory, larger differences are expected for working memory, 
and the largest for fluid reasoning.  
 
The second group of hypotheses predicts that children’s performance on the test 
version designed for their own culture is at least as high as on the test version 
designed for the other culture. These hypotheses are necessary for CCH to be 
correct and not necessary for (but in accordance with) SH:  
3. Afrikaans children score at least as high on the Afrikaans test version as on the 
Tswana version (more specifically, differences between test versions are 
absent or small for short-term memory and attention, larger for working 
memory, and largest for fluid reasoning). 
4. Rural Tswana children score at least as high on the Tswana version as on the 
Afrikaans version (differences between test versions are absent or small for 
short-term memory and attention, larger for working memory, and largest for 
fluid reasoning). 
5. Urban Tswana children score similar on the Afrikaans and Tswana test 
version.  
 
The next group of hypotheses is critical for testing whether CCH or SH is 
supported. CCH predicts that it depends on the test version which group obtains 
the highest score and that one group scores at least as high as the other group(s) on 
the test version developed for its own culture. SH predicts that one group scores 
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consistently higher than the other(s) on both test versions (apart from random 
fluctuations). The following hypotheses are tested: 
6. Afrikaans children score at least as high as urban and rural Tswana children 
on the Afrikaans test version (differences between groups are absent or small 
for short-term memory and attention, larger for working memory, and largest 
for fluid reasoning). 
7. Rural Tswana children score at least as high as Afrikaans children on the 
Tswana test version (differences between groups are absent or small for short-
term memory and attention, larger for working memory, and largest for fluid 
reasoning). 
Both hypotheses need to be confirmed to support CCH. If hypothesis 6 (or 7) is 
confirmed for the working memory and fluid reasoning tests, SH would predict 
that 7 (or 6) is automatically disconfirmed.  
 
The final hypotheses involve the relative positions of the scores of the urban 
Tswana children in between the scores of the two other groups. Confirmation of 
these hypotheses would be in line with both CCH and SH: 
8. Urban Tswana children score in between Afrikaans and rural Tswana children 
on the Afrikaans test version. 
9. Urban Tswana children score in between Afrikaans and rural Tswana children 




The sample consisted of 501 South African primary school children (245 girls, 256 
boys) from grades 3 and 4, with an average age of 9.37 years (SD = 1.05). One 
hundred sixty-one were white urban Afrikaans-speaking children from two 
primary schools in the town of Potchefstroom, North West Province; 181 were 
black urban Setswana-speaking children from two primary schools in Ikageng, a 
township near Potchefstroom; 159 were black rural Setswana-speaking children 
from three primary schools in Ramatlabama, a rural setting 15 kilometres outside 
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of the city of Mafikeng, North-West Province. Besides the linguistic distinction 
between the subsamples (Afrikaans versus Setswana), there was a cultural 
distinction (Afrikaans versus Tswana) and an urban-rural distinction. The latter 
distinction, however, was relative in that the children from Potchefstroom 
(“Afrikaans”) and Ikageng (“urban Tswana”) lived in an urban area as compared to 
the more rural area of Ramatlabama (“rural Tswana”).  
 
Most of the houses of Afrikaans children were made of bricks and had tiled roofs, 
while most houses of the Tswana children had walls of either corrugated iron or 
bricks and roofs of corrugated iron. Eighty-one percent of Afrikaans children had 
their own room as opposed to 31% of the urban Tswana and 40% of the rural 
Tswana children. Afrikaans children had 2.36 cars per family on average, whereas 
35% of the urban Tswana families and 50% of the rural Tswana families had a car.    
 
Instruments 
Five cognitive tests were constructed: a short-term memory test, an attention test, 
a working memory test, a figural fluid reasoning test, and a verbal fluid reasoning 
test. There were two cultural versions of each test, based on the relative 
familiarity of item content: an Afrikaans and a Tswana version. The two test 
versions were developed in a three month pilot phase. We visited children’s 
homes and schools, and spoke to parents, teachers, and specialists (e.g., a child 
psychologist, speech therapist) to obtain information regarding words, objects, 
customs and practices that were familiar to the Afrikaans and Tswana children, 
respectively. Pilot testing took place at three schools and involved 50 children. An 
iterative procedure was applied of translating the test instructions into the local 
languages, administering the instruments to a small number of children, and 
adapting the content and/or instructions if necessary, until the instruments were 
deemed appropriate. The instructions and items of both test versions were 
developed in English and then translated into Afrikaans and Setswana. Afrikaans 
children did (Afrikaans and Tswana) tests in Afrikaans; Tswana children did 
(Afrikaans and Tswana) tests in Setswana. The short-term memory test, attention 
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test, and working memory test had a discontinuation rule: these tests were stopped 
after the child failed three consecutive items. The figural and verbal fluid 
reasoning tests did not have a discontinuation rule.  
 
Short-term memory test. This individually administered test consisted of 24 
items and required the child to repeat word sequences, varying from two to nine 
words, read out loud by the test examiner. Both the Afrikaans and Tswana test 
version used meaningful words with a higher familiarity for the Afrikaans and 
Tswana children, respectively. Examples of words used in the Afrikaans test 
version are “computer”, “camera” and “shower”, and examples of the Tswana test 
version are “tuckshop” (a small food shop that is common in the Tswana 
community), “soccer”, and “braids”.  
 
Attention test. The child’s task in the individually administered attention test 
was to count the number of times he/she heard a pre-specified group of words in 
the sequence of words read out loud by the test examiner. The test consisted of 24 
items. The Afrikaans version targeted groups of two electrical appliances followed 
by one piece of clothing (e.g., Heater – Iron – Trousers); the Tswana version aimed 
at groups of two family members followed by one animal (e.g., Aunt – Son – Dog). 
 
Working memory test. The first 3 items of this individually administered test 
required the child to judge whether a statement was true or false. The following 
18 items required the child to judge whether a statement was true or false and 
remember this while listening to statements that followed. After the test examiner 
finished reading all statements in a single item, the child was asked to say for each 
of them whether it was true or false, in the same order as the examiner read them. 
The number of statements increased (from two to seven) as well as their 
complexity. A statement of the lowest complexity would consist of one single 
sentence (e.g., A fridge is cold); a statement of a higher complexity would consist 
of two combined sentences (e.g., A fridge is cold and a kettle cools water); a 
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statement with the highest complexity contained three combined sentences (e.g., 
A fridge is cold and a kettle cools water and a library has books).  
 
The Afrikaans and Tswana versions consisted of meaningful true/false statements, 
reflecting familiar information for the Afrikaans and Tswana children 
respectively, such as “An alarm can make noise” for the Afrikaans test version and 
“A soccer team has 11 players” for the Tswana test version (soccer is the most 
popular sport among the Tswana children whereas rugby is most popular among 
the Afrikaans). 
 
Figural fluid reasoning test. This individually administered test is based on 
the subtest Situations of the Snijders-Oomen Non-Verbal Intelligence Test, 
Revised (Snijders, Tellegen, & Laros, 1989) and relies on the same principle as 
Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices (Raven, Raven, & Court, 1998b). The child 
was shown a drawing with a missing part and had to choose from various answer 
options which piece best completed the drawing. The Afrikaans and Tswana 
versions consisted of 18 items and contained drawings of situations (at home, in 
school, on the streets) that were highly familiar to the Afrikaans and Tswana 
children, respectively. For example, for the Afrikaans test version, a drawing of a 
swimming pool was included, and the Tswana test version contained a drawing of 
a specific cooking procedure (two women preparing porridge in a three-legged 
pot). The first seven items had one missing part, the next seven items had two, and 
the last four items had three missing parts. Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices 
(Raven et al., 1998b) requires the child to complete a (meaningless) figural pattern 
and was collectively administered. The test was used as a reference point that did 
not reflect the Afrikaans or Tswana test version. Parts A, B, and C (36 items in 
total) were administered; the first two items of part A were used as example items.   
 
Verbal fluid reasoning test. This collectively administered test consisted of 19 
items. The child had to choose one word that did not go together with the other 
three (for the first 16 items) or the other two (for the last 3 items). Both the 
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Afrikaans (e.g., rugby – swimming – cricket – tennis) and Tswana version (e.g., 
grass – fire – three-legged pot – wooden spoon) contained items that were 
presumed to be highly familiar for the Afrikaans and Tswana children, 
respectively. The test examiner read the words out loud and the children could 
read along and circle their answer on an answer sheet.  
 
Design 
The children of each of the three groups (Afrikaans, urban Tswana, and rural 
Tswana) were divided into two subgroups; one for each of the two test versions 
(i.e., Afrikaans and Tswana), reflecting a 3x2 between subjects design. As far as 
possible, the subgroups were matched for sex, grade, and general level of school 
performance as estimated by the teachers. Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices 
was administered to all children to check the comparability of the subgroups that 
were selected for each of the test versions. An ANOVA with test version as 
independent variable and the score on the Raven as dependent variable showed 
that there were no significant differences, F(1, 499) = 0.53, p = .47. When looking 
at the performance differences on the Raven within each of the three groups, we 
found that both for Afrikaans and rural Tswana children, performance on the 
Raven did not significantly differ for the two different test versions. For the urban 
Tswana children however, the children selected for the Afrikaans test version 
performed significantly higher than those selected for the Tswana test version, 
F(1, 179) = 5.41, p < .05, partial η2 = .03. 
 
Familiarity questions  
Content familiarity was assessed as a manipulation check of the perceived 
familiarity of both test versions. After each cognitive test administration, the 
children answered two content familiarity questions: 1) Were there any 
words/drawings that you did not know well in the task? (reverse keyed: none, a 
few, many); 2) How well did you know the words/drawings that we used in the 
task? (not at all, a bit, very well). For each of the two test versions (i.e., Afrikaans 
and Tswana), a factor analysis was performed on these two items for all tests of 
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that particular test version (explained variances were 34%, 31%, and Cronbach’s 
alpha values were .76 and .72, respectively). The factor scores were used as 
indicator of perceived content familiarity.   
 
Socioeconomic status 
Children were asked six questions as an indication of socioeconomic status (SES): 
1) “Do you have your own room?” (yes, no); 2) “How many televisions are there in 
your house?”; 3) “Is there a microwave in your house?” (yes, no); 4) How many 
(cell)phones does your family (i.e., the people the child lives with) have?”; 5) 
“How many cars does your family have?”; 6) Do you have (reading) books at 
home?” (yes, no). One factor was extracted from these items (explained variance = 
41%, Cronbach’s alpha = .63) and the factor scores were used in further analyses.  
 
Procedure 
Eleven Afrikaans-speaking and eleven Setswana-speaking females were trained to 
administer the test battery. Seventeen were Psychology students, one had 
obtained her degree in Social Work, and four had completed high school. Consent 
for participation of the children in the study was obtained through the school 
principals. Individual testing took place in rooms that were made available by the 
schools and took about one hour for each child. One test examiner tested four 
children on average in a school day. Two tests (Raven’s Standard Progressive 
Matrices and verbal fluid reasoning) were administered collectively in the 
classroom in about one hour; administration took place after all children had 
undergone individual testing. 
 
Results 
Results are described in three sections. We first present preliminary analyses on 
item bias, score standardization, background variables, reliability, and the 
manipulation check of perceived familiarity. This is followed by a validation of the 
cognitive structure that is hypothesized to underlie the test battery. Finally, a 
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Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) is presented that tests for the 
effects of group and test version on the cognitive test scores. 
 
Preliminary analyses 
Item bias. Item bias (differential item functioning) was computed in a logistic 
regression procedure in which item scores were predicted on the basis of group 
membership (dummy coded), score level, and their interaction. The analyses 
showed that some items were biased; however, the effect sizes were small. We did 
not exclude any items from further analyses.  
 
Score standardization. For each of the five cognitive tests, sum scores were 
computed for each of the two versions (combining Afrikaans, urban Tswana, and 
rural Tswana children). Analyses of these raw sum scores showed that 
significantly higher scores were obtained for the Tswana version of the attention 
test and the working memory test than for the Afrikaans version. To correct for 
these differences in difficulty levels, scores were standardized for each test version 
for all tests, thereby enabling a direct comparison of scores across versions.  
 
Sex, grade, and socioeconomic status. In a MANOVA with sex as 
independent variable and the sum score of each test (standardized for test version) 
as dependent variables, we found a significant main effect of sex on short-term 
memory (F[1, 499] = 4.56, p < .05, partial η2 = .01) and verbal fluid reasoning (F[1, 
499] = 4.80 p < .05, partial η2 = .01). Girls scored higher on these tests than boys. A 
MANOVA with grade as independent variable showed significant main effects for 
all test scores (p < .01, partial η2 varying from .02 for verbal fluid reasoning to .04 
for working memory). The socioeconomic level of the Afrikaans children was 
significantly higher than that of both Setswana-speaking groups, F(2, 498) = 
244.04, p < .01, partial η2 = .50. A MANOVA with SES as independent variable 
showed a main effect for all test scores (p < .01, partial η2 varying from .03 for 
attention to .12 for verbal fluid reasoning), except for short-term memory. Higher 
SES was associated with higher cognitive test scores.  
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Reliability of cognitive tests. Table 5.1 gives an overview of the internal 
consistencies for all tests, specified for group and test version. Most values were 
acceptable to high. The highest values were found for the attention test; lowest 
values were found for the verbal fluid reasoning test.  
 
Table 5.1 
Internal consistencies of all cognitive tests for each group 
  Group 
Test and version Afrikaans urban Tswana  rural Tswana  overall group 
Short-term memorya    
  Afrikaans .60 .79 .78 .75 
  Tswana .62 .81 .67 .74 
Attentiona     
  Afrikaans .95 .94 .93 .94 
  Tswana .95 .93 .91 .93 
Working memorya    
  Afrikaans .79 .78 .57 .78 
  Tswana .75 .77 .71 .75 
Figural fluid reasoningb    
  Afrikaans .58 .89 .69 .89 
  Tswana .60 .81 .80 .77 
Verbal fluid reasoningb    
  Afrikaans .38 .46 .58 .61 
  Tswana .63 .71 .66 .70 
aValues are split-half reliabilities corrected for test length with the Spearman-Brown 
formula. 
bValues are Cronbach’s alpha values. 
 
Manipulation check. Content familiarity was assessed as a manipulation check 
to establish whether the perceived familiarity was higher for the version of the 
own group than for the other version and to establish whether the perceived 
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familiarity of a group’s own test version was higher than the other groups’ 
perceived familiarity of this same version. For each group, an ANOVA was 
performed with test version (two levels: Afrikaans and Tswana) as independent 
variable and the score on the familiarity questions (factor score) as dependent 
variable. For the Afrikaans group, the perceived familiarity of the Afrikaans 
version was significantly higher than that of the Tswana version F(1, 159) = 35.89, 
p < .01, partial η2 = .18. For the urban Tswana group, there were no significant 
differences in perceived familiarity between the test versions, F(1, 179) = 1.05, p = 
.31, partial η2 = .01. The rural Tswana group perceived the Tswana test version as 
more familiar than the Afrikaans version, F(1, 157) = 9.71, p < .01, partial η2 = .06. 
 
Subsequently, for each test version, an ANOVA was performed with group (three 
levels: Afrikaans, urban Tswana, and rural Tswana) as independent variable and 
the score on the familiarity questions (factor score) as dependent variable. 
Familiarity scores of the Afrikaans group were significantly higher than those of 
both Setswana-speaking groups on the Afrikaans test version, F(2, 250) = 97.03, p 
< .01, partial η2 = .44 (post hoc analyses with Bonferroni criterion). On the Tswana 
test version, Afrikaans children scored significantly higher than the urban Tswana 
group,  F(2, 245) = 9.00, p < .01, partial η2 = .07. There were no significant 
differences between the Afrikaans and rural Tswana group and between the urban 
Tswana and rural Tswana group. Even though Afrikaans children reported a 
relatively high familiarity on the Tswana test version, the score differences 
between the Afrikaans group and the two other groups were smaller on the 
Tswana version than on the Afrikaans version, and the percentage of explained 
variance by familiarity was also substantially smaller. The manipulation check 
largely supported the adequacy of familiarity differences of the test versions. 
 
A MANOVA with the score on the familiarity questions (factor score) as 
independent variable showed a significant effect for all cognitive test scores (p < 
.01, partial η2 varying from .03 for short-term memory to .16 for figural fluid 
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reasoning); as could be expected, higher familiarity was associated with higher test 













Note. All depicted parameter estimates are significant, p < .01 
 
Figure 5.2 
Cognitive structure underlying the data 
 
Validity of cognitive structure 
Using structural equation modeling (Arbuckle, 2008), the validity of the 
hypothesized cognitive structure (Figure 5.1) was tested. For the overall sample (N 
= 501), with scores standardized for test version and for group, we found an 
excellent fit (χ2[2, N = 501] = 1.89, p = .39, χ2/df = .95, GFI = 1.00, AGFI = .99, TLI 
= 1.00, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00), confirming hypothesis 1a. The model is 
displayed in Figure 5.2. For both short-term memory and attention, the relation 
with fluid reasoning is partially mediated by the association between working 
memory and fluid reasoning. Multigroup analyses testing the invariance of the 
model across the test versions showed a good fit when all parameters were 
identical (χ2[17, N = 501] = 28.76, p < .05, χ2/df = 1.69, GFI = .98, AGFI = .96, TLI = 




















testing the invariance of the model across the three groups showed that only the 
unconstrained model (configural invariance) provided an excellent fit (χ2[6, N = 
501] = 7.16, p = .31, χ2/df = 1.19, GFI = .99, AGFI = .96, TLI = .99, CFI = 1.00, 
RMSEA = .02), disconfirming hypothesis 1c. The reason for the lack of fit of 
models with more invariance constraints is not clear.  
 
Table 5.2 
MANOVA on cognitive test scores 
Source F a p partial η2 
Group Between subjects 
   Short-term memory 8.34 .00 .03 
   Attention 2.38 .09 .01 
   Working memory 3.74 .03 .02 
   Figural fluid reasoning 13.62 .00 .05 
   Verbal fluid reasoning 11.33 .00 .04 
Group x Test version    
   Short-term memory 7.80 .00 .03 
   Attention 0.57  .57 .00 
   Working memory 10.07 .00 .04 
   Figural fluid reasoning 23.10 .00 .09 
   Verbal fluid reasoning 2.43 .09 .01 
Error    
   Short-term memory (0.90)   
   Attention (0.95)   
   Working memory (0.86)   
   Figural fluid reasoning (0.77)   
   Verbal fluid reasoning (0.81)   
Note. The values for Test version are not displayed in this table because scores were 
standardized for each test version, leaving no significant main effects. Values in 
brackets represent mean square errors. 
adf (2, 495) 
Rugby Versus Soccer in South Africa 
100 
MANOVA on cognitive test scores 
To correct the cognitive test scores for the effects of sex, grade, and SES, we first 
performed a MANOVA with these variables as independent variables and the 
scores on each test (standardized for test version) as dependent variables, and 
saved the residual scores. Then a MANOVA was performed with test version (two 
levels: Afrikaans and Tswana) and group (three levels: Afrikaans, urban Tswana, 
and rural Tswana) as independent variables, and the residual scores as dependent 
variables (see Table 5.2). Test version had no significant effect, due to the 
standardization of the scores for each test version. Group showed a significant 
effect on all test scores except for attention. Interactions between group and test 
version were significant for short-term memory, working memory, and figural 
fluid reasoning. They were not significant for attention and verbal fluid reasoning. 
 
Figures 5.3 to 5.7 show the mean z scores and the significance of the score 
differences between the groups and between the test versions for each cognitive 
test in univariate tests. Score differences were expected to increase with cognitive 
complexity. When comparing Figures 5.3 to 5.7, it becomes clear that hardly any 
score differences were found for attention and larger differences were found for 
working memory and figural fluid reasoning. Contrary to our expectations, quite 
large differences were found for short-term memory and small differences for 
verbal fluid reasoning. Hypothesis 2 was only partially confirmed. 
 
Table 5.3 provides an overview of the (dis)confirmation of hypotheses 3 to 9. 
Afrikaans children performed significantly better on their own test version than 
on the Tswana test version for short-term memory, working memory, and figural 
fluid reasoning, and performed equally on both versions for attention and verbal 
fluid reasoning. This confirms hypothesis 3 for all tests except short-term memory 
(we expected small or no differences) and verbal fluid reasoning (we expected 
large differences). The rural Tswana children scored significantly higher on the 
Tswana test version than on the Afrikaans version for short-term memory, 
working memory, and figural fluid reasoning. For attention and verbal fluid 
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reasoning, scores did not significantly differ for the Afrikaans and Tswana version. 
These findings confirmed hypothesis 4 for all tests with the same two exceptions: 
short-term memory (we expected small or no differences) and verbal fluid 
reasoning (we expected large differences). The urban Tswana children performed 
equally well on the Afrikaans and Tswana test version for all tests, confirming 
hypothesis 5 for all tests. 
 
Afrikaans children scored significantly higher than the Tswana children on the 
Afrikaans test version for each of the five tests, except for the attention test that 
did not show significant differences. Hypothesis 6 was confirmed for all tests 
except for short-term memory (we expected small or no differences); yet, the 
difference was only significant in comparison with the rural Tswana group. This 
group did not score significantly higher than the Afrikaans children on any of the 
tests of the Tswana test version (disconfirming hypothesis 7 for the working 
memory and fluid reasoning tests, for which we expected large differences). Urban 
Tswana children scored in between Afrikaans and rural Tswana children on the 
Afrikaans test version of all tests, except for short-term memory; hypothesis 8 is 
confirmed for all tests except for short-term memory. Urban Tswana children did 
not score in between Afrikaans and rural Tswana children on the Tswana test 
version of short-term memory and verbal fluid reasoning, disconfirming 
hypothesis 9 for these tests. For the other tests of the Tswana version, there were 
no significant differences between the groups (confirming hypothesis 9 for these 
tests).  
 





















Note. Arrows indicate significant differences (post hoc analyses with Bonferroni 
criterion). Significant differences between test versions: F(1, 159) = 13.95, p < .01 
(Afrikaans group) and F(1, 157) = 5.18, p < .05 (rural Tswana group). Significant 
differences between groups: F(2, 250) = 8.07, p < .01 (Afrikaans version) and F(2, 245) 
= 8.23, p < .01 (Tswana version). 
 
Figure 5.3 













































































Note. Arrows indicate significant differences (post hoc analyses with Bonferroni 
criterion). Significant differences between test versions: F(1, 159) = 10.22, p < .01 
(Afrikaans group) and F(1, 157) = 12.15, p < .01 (rural Tswana group). Significant 
differences between groups: F(2, 250) = 12.82, p < .01 (Afrikaans version). 
 
Figure 5.5 








































Note. Arrows indicate significant differences (post hoc analyses with Bonferroni 
criterion). Significant differences between test versions: F(1, 159) = 43.57, p < .01 
(Afrikaans group) and F(1, 157) = 23.47, p < .01 (rural Tswana group). Significant 
differences between groups: F(2, 250) = 47.95, p < .01 (Afrikaans version). 
 
Figure 5.6 





































Note. Arrows indicate significant differences (post hoc analyses with Bonferroni 
criterion). Significant differences between groups: F(2, 250) = 10.25, p < .01 (Afrikaans 
version) and F(2, 245) = 3.96, p < .05 (Tswana version). 
 
Figure 5.7 























Confirmation of hypotheses 3 to 9 for all cognitive tests 
  Expected score pattern   Cognitive test  










3    Afrikaans Afrikaans ≥ Tswana no yes yes yes noa 
4    Rural  Afrikaans ≤ Tswana no yes yes yes noa 
5    Urban Afrikaans = Tswana yes yes yes yes yes 
 Test version Group      
6    Afrikaans Afrikaans ≥ urban & rural Tswana nob yes yes yes yes 
7    Tswana Afrikaans ≤ rural Tswana yes yes noa noa noa 
8    Afrikaans Afrikaans ≥ urban Tswana ≥  rural Tswana no yes yes yes yes 
9    Tswana Afrikaans ≤ urban Tswana ≤ rural Tswana no yes yes yes no 
Note. Hypotheses 3, 4, 6, and 7 are correct for short-term memory and attention when score differences are absent or small, for 
working memory when they are large(r) and for fluid reasoning when they are largest. aScore differences were not significant. bThe 
difference was significant for the Afrikaans and rural Tswana group. 
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CCH predicts that the cross-cultural score differences are explained by the cultural 
complexity of the tests (conceptualized in the present study as the extent to which 
test content is more familiar to one of the compared groups). In analysis of 
variance terms, CCH predicts that only disordinal interactions are found between 
test version and group for the tests with high cognitive complexity: it depends on 
the test version which group scores highest. SH predicts that cross-cultural score 
differences can be explained by differences in general cognitive ability. This 
implies that, according to SH, only main effects for group and, possibly, ordinal 
interactions between test version and group are expected for the high cognitively 
complex tests: one group scores consistently higher than the other(s). In line with 
expectations, the largest score differences were found for the (theoretically) more 
cognitively complex tasks. Most significant interactions on these tests were found 
for the Afrikaans and rural Tswana group and were disordinal, in line with CCH 
and not with SH. Differences between the Afrikaans and rural Tswana group were 
largest for the Afrikaans version of figural fluid reasoning (F(1, 160) = 155.77, p < 
.01, partial η2 = .49, Cohen’s d = 1.96). Figural fluid reasoning showed the largest 
differences between test versions in both the Afrikaans group (F(1, 159) = 43.57, p 
< .01, partial η2 = .22, d = 1.04) and the rural Tswana group F(1, 157) = 23.47, p < 
.01, partial η2 = .13, d = -0.76).  
 
Discussion 
Where do cross-cultural differences in cognitive test scores come from? 
Spearman’s Hypothesis (SH) holds that the differences are mainly caused by cross-
cultural differences in cognitive abilities; however, we expect them to be 
dependent on the cultural rather than cognitive complexity of a test (Cultural 
Complexity Hypothesis, CCH). In the current study the content familiarity of five 
cognitive tests was manipulated to examine its effect on test performance. Two 
test versions were created, an Afrikaans and a Tswana version. The tests were 
administered to groups of (urban) Afrikaans children, (urban) Tswana children 
from the same area as the Afrikaans children, and (rural) Tswana children from an 
area that is relatively isolated from Afrikaans culture. We found an excellent fit of 
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our hypothesized cognitive structure when analyzing the sample as a whole. The 
relation of both short-term memory and attention with fluid reasoning was 
partially mediated by working memory. Only configural invariance could be 
established in a comparison of the factor structure for the three groups (Afrikaans, 
urban Tswana, and rural Tswana). Afrikaans and rural Tswana children generally 
performed better on the test version that was designed for their own group than 
on the other test version. The urban Tswana group did not score differently on the 
Afrikaans and Tswana test version, showing that these children have enough 
knowledge of both cultures to perform equally on both versions. Afrikaans 
children generally scored higher on the Afrikaans version than the Tswana 
children. Tswana children however, did not significantly score higher than the 
Afrikaans children on the Tswana test version. Nevertheless, most performance 
differences between the groups were smaller on this version than on the Afrikaans 
version; the rural Tswana group scored significantly higher on the Tswana version 
than on the Afrikaans version and the Afrikaans group scored significantly lower. 
We can conclude that our results support the idea that the content familiarity of 
tests was an important moderator of cross-cultural differences in test scores in that 
children generally performed better on the test version that was designed for their 
own group than on another test version.  
 
The short-term memory test appeared to be more sensitive for group differences 
than expected, given the test’s low cognitive complexity. Urban Tswana children 
scored highest on both versions of this test. We could not capture any educational 
characteristics that could explain these findings (such as specific training of 
memory abilities or a stronger reliance on rote learning in the urban Tswana 
group as compared to the other groups). Overall, the largest score differences were 
found between the Afrikaans and the rural Tswana groups for the working 
memory and figural fluid reasoning tests. These tests are seen as cognitively more 
complex than the attention and short-term memory tests. SH would predict that 
on two test versions with a comparable level of cognitive complexity, regardless of 
content, score differences between groups are in the same direction (i.e., 
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interactions between test version and group are ordinal). However, on inspection 
of our results, there were significant score differences on the Afrikaans version 
and no significant differences on the Tswana version (interactions were 
disordinal). One could argue that the difficulty level of the Tswana version was 
lower than that of the Afrikaans version; however, this was only the case for the 
working memory test. More importantly, regardless of the level of difficulty, the 
Afrikaans children performed significantly lower on the Tswana version than on 
the Afrikaans version. Therefore, we conclude that our findings are not in line 
with SH, and that it is cultural rather than cognitive complexity that explains most 
differences between groups, providing support for CCH.  
 
Our study fits in a pattern of studies that have given arguments to question the 
validity of SH. The first type of argument focuses on the statistical analyses applied 
to test SH that are said to be too lenient (see Dolan et al., 2004). The second type 
of argument concerns the confounding of cognitive complexity with cultural 
complexity in current tests of SH. A high loading on a general cognitive ability 
factor does not merely imply a high cognitive complexity, but usually goes 
together with higher cultural complexity. Confirmations of SH that have been 
reported in the literature (e.g., Hartmann et al., 2007; Lynn & Owen, 1994; Te 
Nijenhuis & Van der Flier, 1997) may be based on this confounding in the data. 
We confirmed findings by Helms-Lorenz et al. (2003) which indicated that SH can 
only be tested when cultural complexity and cognitive complexity are both varied 
independently. Data from the present study and from Helms-Lorenz et al. show 
that when these types of complexity are unconfounded, SH is not supported.  
 
In addition to experimentally manipulating the content familiarity of the tests by 
creating two versions, familiarity questions were used to check the perceived 
familiarity of both versions. The content familiarity questions served their purpose 
of a manipulation check relatively well; yet their validity could be challenged. 
First, social desirability could have played a role in that children indicated to 
know certain words or drawings because they believed they were expected to 
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know these. Second, children may not have good insight in their familiarity with 
stimuli as compared to tasks. Some children found it difficult to independently 
evaluate the complexity of stimuli (words and drawings) and of the task (what had 
to be done with the stimuli). Content familiarity appeared very difficult to 
measure. Rather than merely relying on self-report, it would be an idea to include 
a more objective measure of content familiarity. A test exposing children to 
various types of test content and measuring their reaction time in manipulating 
this content might circumvent the validity issues.   
 
This study has two limitations. First, the results show that the Afrikaans and 
Tswana versions of the verbal fluid reasoning test were not culturally loaded to 
the extent that they could show differences between the groups. It was difficult to 
construct items that tap cultural complexity to the same degree and show 
substantial variation in difficulty; this lack of coherence could have resulted in the 
low internal consistencies. Second, for each of the four cognitive abilities reflected 
in our test battery, only one test was used (except for fluid reasoning, for which 
two tests were used). To find more unequivocal support for the cognitive structure 
underlying the tests (as displayed in Figure 5.1), probably more tests would need 
to be included.  
 
Our study has some practical implications. Unfamiliar test content can have a 
significant negative effect on a child’s test performance, possibly providing an 
inaccurate estimation (underestimation) of the child’s ability. Therefore, tests need 
to be selected on the appropriateness of their content whenever possible. The 
content familiarity of a cognitive test should be taken into account when 
evaluating a child’s performance or when cross-culturally comparing scores. 
Dynamic testing procedures provide an opportunity to overcome at least some 
cross-cultural differences in familiarity. The more traditional static tests evaluate 
the child’s current cognitive performance, which is influenced by the test’s 
cultural complexity and might not be a good reflection of the underlying cognitive 
ability. However, dynamic testing consists of a pre-test phase, a training phase, 
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and a post-test phase (e.g., Sternberg & Grigorenko, 2002) and is focused on the 
child’s ability to learn, reflected in the score difference between the pre- and post-
test. The child’s cognitive ability as measured by dynamic testing is less influenced 
by cultural complexity (Hessels, 1997; Sternberg et al., 2002). The combination of 
appropriate item content and dynamic testing is promising in closing the cross-
cultural gap in test scores.  
 
The present study also has a theoretical implication. Cognitive abilities are domain 
dependent (i.e., their expression is dependent on aspects such as the type of 
cognitive task and the familiarity of its stimuli), notably the more complex 
abilities; however, SH does not consider domain features as relevant in the 
explanation of cross-cultural differences in cognitive test scores. Neo-Piagetian 
psychology (e.g., Demetriou, Shayer, & Efklides, 1992) and cognitive psychology 
(e.g., Keane & Eysenck, 2005) include domain features in their models. Cognitive 
models that accommodate cross-cultural differences in abilities should also 
incorporate these features (such as stimulus familiarity). Models of cross-cultural 
differences in cognitive functioning can only be comprehensive when they 





Summary and General Discussion 
 
The broad underlying question I address in this dissertation is how culture and 
children’s cognition are related. Taking into account bias in assessment 
procedures, I have shed light on this relation from three angles. The first focused 
on detecting and reducing bias in cognitive tests (Chapters 2 and 3); the second 
examined cultural influences on the relation between a child’s home environment 
and cognition (Chapter 4); the third manipulated bias by varying the content 
familiarity of tests to answer the question of why some cognitive tests show more 
cross-cultural differences than others (Chapter 5).  
 
Summary of chapters 
Chapter 2 described and applied a judgmental (qualitative) procedure for cognitive 
test adaptations. The procedure consisted of iterations of translating, piloting, and 
modifying the instrument. Five types of adaptations for cognitive instruments 
were distinguished, based on the underlying source: construct, language, culture, 
theory, and familiarity, respectively. The proposed procedure was applied in an 
adaptation of the Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children, second edition 
(KABC-II) for 6- to 10-year-old Kannada-speaking children of low socioeconomic 
status in Bangalore, India. Each subtest needed extensive adaptations, illustrating 
that the transfer of Western cognitive instruments to a non-Westernized context 
requires a careful analysis of their appropriateness. Adaptations were needed of 
test instructions, item content of both verbal and non-verbal tests, and item order. 
It was concluded that the qualitative approach adopted here could adequately 
identify various problems with the application of the KABC-II in this sample that 
would have remained unnoticed with a close translation of the original 
instrument.  
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Chapter 3 evaluated the psychometric adequacy of the extensive adaptation of the 
KABC-II. The subtests showed high reliabilities in a sample of 598 children, the 
Cattell-Horn-Carroll model underlying the original KABC-II was largely 
replicated, and external relations with demographic characteristics and an 
achievement measure were consistent with expectations. The subtests showed 
relatively high loadings on the general cognitive factor, presumably due to the 
high task novelty and hence, cognitive complexity of the tests for the children. 
The findings support the suitability and validity of the KABC-II adaptation. It was 
concluded that test adaptations can only be adequate if they meet both judgmental 
(qualitative) and statistical (quantitative) adaptation criteria.  
 
Chapter 4 examined the associations between the home environment and 
cognitive performance of the Indian children. The primary caregivers of 532 
children that underwent the KABC-II test administration (see Chapter 3) were 
interviewed. The path model supported the applicability of environment-
cognition relations as suggested by the investment model and family stress model, 
both mainly based on Western data. More proximal variables (caregiver’s mental 
health, social support, family conflict, and parental behaviors) showed stronger 
associations with cognitive performance than more distal variables (socioeconomic 
status); the link between the latter and cognitive outcome was fully mediated by 
the more proximal variables. Only the direct involvement of parents with their 
child through providing stimulation and structure was directly related to outcome. 
Interventions to improve developmental outcomes should therefore target the 
most proximal parental behaviors. 
 
In Chapter 5 cross-cultural differences in cognitive test scores were hypothesized 
to depend on a test’s cultural complexity (Cultural Complexity Hypothesis: CCH) 
as reflected in its content familiarity rather than on its cognitive complexity 
(Spearman’s Hypothesis: SH). The content familiarity of tests assessing short-term 
memory, attention, working memory, and figural and verbal fluid reasoning, was 
manipulated by constructing test versions with an item content derived from 
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either Afrikaans or Tswana culture in South Africa. Both test versions were 
administered to children of both cultures. The sample consisted of 161 urban 
Afrikaans-speaking, 181 urban and 159 rural Setswana-speaking children. The 
results disconfirmed SH and supported CCH; children generally performed best on 
the test version that was designed for their own group, particularly for the 
cognitively and culturally complex working memory and figural fluid reasoning 
tests. Content familiarity is an important moderator of cognitive test performance 
that should be taken into account, particularly in cross-cultural comparisons of 
scores. 
 
Discussion of main findings 
With Chapters 2 and 3 I have shown that cognitive instruments developed and 
validated in a Western context can be adapted for use in a completely different 
cultural context, even though the process is extensive and time-consuming. Many 
more test aspects than anticipated required adjustments; bias is everywhere. The 
adaptation did not only deal with cultural differences between the original 
(American) context and the target (Indian) context; linguistic and socioeconomic 
differences were also addressed. Most of the adaptations were driven by the 
familiarity of item content and of tasks, implying that familiarity is the main point 
of concern when adapting a test. To properly improve a test’s suitability for the 
target context, various experts need to be included in the study, such as 
psychologists, linguists, teachers, and parents. Both qualitative and quantitative 
procedures are required to evaluate the success of any adaptation.  
 
Chapter 4 indicated that the salience of certain environment-cognition relations 
can differ across cultures and across socioeconomic strata. In that sense, bias does 
not only affect the generalizability of a cognitive test, but also the generalizability 
of relations between environmental and outcome variables. A distinction can be 
made between factors in the home environment that are either distal or proximal 
to a child’s cognitive performance. Interventions that focus on distal factors by 
improving a family’s socioeconomic status (by educating caregivers or by an 
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increase in family income) would only have effect on a long term. Interventions 
targeting the most proximal parental behaviors by stimulating parents’ direct 
involvement with their children seem most effective and also most feasible on a 
short term.  
 
Chapters 2 and 3 already stressed the importance of familiarity for the 
appropriateness of a test. Chapter 5 provided further support for this finding by 
showing the impact of content familiarity on a child’s cognitive test performance. 
Strong indications were found for the role of cultural complexity in explaining 
cross-cultural score differences. Knowing that it is the content familiarity of a test 
rather than a cross-cultural difference in general cognitive ability that largely 




Adoption, assembly, or adaptation 
The findings from Chapters 2 and 3 are in line with those from Abubakar et al. 
(2007) and Holding et al. (2004), who also demonstrated the necessity and utility 
of an adaptation of a Western instrument for a non-Western context. It is 
common, though, to directly translate tests into the target language without 
further adjustments (Van de Vijver & Poortinga, 2005). When tests are used in 
another context without making changes in any of the test aspects or procedures, 
the validity of the test scores is questionable in case the cultural gap between the 
culture in which the test originated and the target culture is large. This 
dissertation shows that adaptation can be a useful tool to bridge this gap. I strongly 
suggest that the choice between adoption, adaptation, and assembly, is an integral 
part of any test selection procedure and is justifiable. 
 
Choosing to adapt. I chose for the option of adaptation to be able to retain test 
elements that are suitable for the target context and adjust the elements that are 
culturally inappropriate. Adoption would not have been an option since it is only 
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appropriate when there are small (linguistic and cultural) differences between the 
original and target context. One might wonder why I preferred the option of 
adaptation over developing an appropriate test from scratch in the target culture 
itself (i.e., assembly), since in the latter case, the cultural suitability of tasks and 
response formats is largely guaranteed. An issue with locally developed tests, 
however, is that they are usually not based on a solid (i.e., cross-culturally tested) 
cognitive model. Without having a well-founded underlying structure, it is 
difficult to evaluate what the test actually measures; the validity is doubtful since 
there is no clear point of reference. There are also some downsides to the use of 
test adaptations. First, there is a need for specialized statistical procedures that can 
deal with nonoverlap of items across cultures such as item response theory and 
structural equation modeling (Van de Vijver & Leung, 1997). Second, adaptation 
does not necessarily take into account that certain cognitive abilities that are 
evaluated as important in the culture from which the test originates might be less 
relevant and less valued in the target culture. The universalistic approach that was 
adopted in this study does, however, not argue that all cognitive abilities have the 
same importance or the same manifestations across cultures; it merely emphasizes 
the universality of the underlying cognitive functions. The current study 
supported the validity of the chosen approach; presumably aided by the thorough 
test adaptations, the underlying CHC model was replicated.  
 
Universalism and adaptation. From the discussion on the costs and benefits 
of the three methods of test transfer, I can conclude that the method of adaptation 
is particularly suitable for studies that are conducted from a universalistic point of 
view. Many studies are based on this point of view, leaving ample opportunity for 
successfully applying adaptations. Assembly would be more appropriate when 
researchers take a relativistic perspective. Adoption of tests is preferred over 
adaptation when the gap between original and target culture is negligibly small, 
regardless of the researcher’s perspective of absolutism, universalism or relativism.  
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Explaining cross-cultural score differences 
Chapter 5 focused on detecting the source of cross-cultural differences in 
cognitive test scores. Spearman’s Hypothesis has been widely studied and has been 
widely confirmed. Criticism has also been expressed toward the role of cognitive 
complexity in explaining score differences. I have shown that cultural complexity 
played a more important part in explaining the differences between groups than 
the level of cognitive ability that is required to successfully complete a test. It is 
understandable that the explanations of cognitive and cultural complexity are 
often confounded. There is a correlation between a test’s cognitive and cultural 
complexity; the higher the cognitive complexity of a test, the more cultural 
(contextual) information is usually needed to perform well.  
 
The importance of cultural complexity in explaining cross-cultural differences 
does not imply that cognitive complexity does not matter. When one of the 
studied groups has very little experience with certain cognitive tasks and less 
training than the other groups in the cognitive abilities reflected in those tasks, 
performance of its members is negatively influenced. As as consequence, cross-
cultural score differences are not merely a reflection of differences in familiarity 
with test content but also of differences in skills as a result of differences in 
cognitive ability training. This implies that research aimed at addressing cross-
cultural score differences should take both explanations (cultural and cognitive 
complexity) into account and should be careful in drawing conclusions on the 
importance of one as compared to the other. 
 
Interventions fostering child development 
Chapters 2, 3, and 5 emphasized the importance of appropriate assessment 
instruments. Chapter 4 illustrated one of the purposes for which culturally 
appropriate tests are of major importance, namely for obtaining an accurate 
measure of factors in the child’s home environment that affect developmental 
outcomes. The chapter showed that the aspects in the home environment that are 
most proximal to the child’s cognitive performance are the ones that matter the 
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most. Making mothers aware of the influence they can have on their children’s 
cognitive outcome constitutes an important target for interventions that foster 
child development. Direct maternal involvement with the child through 
providing structure and stimulation appears to be essential. However, views on the 
importance of and the responsibility for stimulating a child’s cognition presumably 
show cross-cultural differences. The Indian caregivers of low socioeconomic 
background as described in Chapter 4 do perhaps not see it as their duty to 
promote their child’s cognitive development but defer this task to school teachers. 
Bronfenbrenner (1979) identified three microsystems (home, school, and peers) 
that affect a school going child’s development. Combined interventions in all 
three areas might have a much larger impact on child development than an 
intervention in one of them. Nevertheless, this dissertation contributes to the 
knowledge on targets for intervention in one of the microsystems, by identifying 
crucial factors in the home environment of the low SES Indian child.    
 
Integrating culture, cognition and bias 
In the introduction I presented a simple model describing the relation between 
the three key concepts of this dissertation, being culture, cognition, and bias. 
Studies on the relation between the first two concepts can only be done by taking 
into account the third. The model is displayed once more in Figure 6.1. The 
studies described in Chapters 2 to 5 focused on the direct living environment of 
the child, as a reflection of a broader cultural context. Bias was examined, 
incorporated, or dealt with in the measurement of various parenting behaviors in 
the day to day life of the child as well as in the measurement of cognitive abilities. 
If there is no bias in any of the assessment instruments, measurements of the 
child’s environment and cognition reflect the actual environment and actual 
cognitive abilities. This unbiased assessment is the ultimate aim of any research, 
especially in a cross-cultural context. Because a complete absence of bias is highly 
unlikely, I emphasize the necessity to take this concept into consideration in any 
study, regardless of the often high face validity of assessment instruments.  
 














A model of culture, cognition, and bias 
 
The future of cognitive testing 
How bad is bias? 
Whereas Chapters 2 and 3 focused on the reduction of bias and thereby viewed it 
as something negative that should be avoided or removed, Chapter 5 showed that 
bias is not necessarily bad. A culture free test does not exist; the closest alternative 
may seem a culture fair test, for which one group does not have better chances 
than another group to perform well. Decontextualizing a test (i.e. reducing bias) 
seems to lead to the development of such a culture fair test. However, even if 
groups are equally exposed to testing situations and certain types of tasks, they 
usually differ in their familiarity with the task content (e.g., drawings or words). It 
is impossible to obtain a test that is equally familiar to all included groups, 
implying that it is impossible to completely eliminate bias. Reducing bias against a 
cultural group by adapting a test usually implies introducing bias against other 
groups. Apparently, decontextualizing does not provide the desired result and we 
should rather focus on contextualizing (i.e., taking into account bias instead of 
trying to avoid bias) by ensuring that tests are as familiar as possible for the target 











Contextualized tests and cross-cultural research: do they go together? 
Constructing a test in such a way that the content is contextualized seems hard to 
combine with cross-cultural research that focuses on comparing scores across 
groups that substantially differ from each other culturally. The downside of this 
approach after all is that not one and the same test is administered to different 
groups; the equivalence of these test versions then needs to be tested to draw 
conclusions on the comparability of scores. When test versions are being 
constructed for each of the target groups of a study, independent raters can be 
asked to rate the cultural complexity of the item content so as to obtain 
comparable levels for all test versions. In addition, all versions could be 
administered to a representative sample of all included groups. When the 
difficulty level of the test versions is found to be equal (i.e., the average scores for 
all groups combined are similar across test versions), these versions can be used in 
cross-cultural comparisons of these groups. In the actual data collection, the 
abilities of members of the included groups are then only assessed with the test 
version that was designed for their own group. The question, however, remains 
whether these test versions can really be treated as each other’s (context-
dependent) substitutes.  
 
By including more tests of the same cognitive ability, a clearer and more objective 
view of this ability can be obtained. It would be desirable but it does not seem 
feasible to include more than one culturally adapted instrument of the same 
ability. A more feasible alternative would perhaps be to also include a 
decontextualized test (i.e., a test with the lowest possible level of bias) and 
administer this same test to all included groups. Correlations with the scores on 
this decontextualized test should not differ substantially between both 
contextualized versions. The best indication of cognitive ability might then be the 
average of the scores on the contextualized and the decontextualized test. Even 
though this process of obtaining indications of cognitive abilities is laborious, I do 
believe that this is the direction that should be taken when the aim is to assess 
cognitive abilities in a culturally sensitive way. Besides properly selecting the 
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appropriate tests or making useful cultural adaptations, another point of attention 
is the use of dynamic as opposed to static cognitive tests.   
 
Dynamic versus static testing 
A traditional static test measures current performance, which is only a snap-shot 
of the underlying cognitive abilities. As I emphasized in this dissertation, current 
performance can be affected by many factors (captured by the term “bias”) that 
distort the representation of actual abilities. Dynamic testing has been proposed to 
provide a more valid (i.e., less biased) indication of these actual abilities. The 
procedure commonly consists of a pre-test phase, a training phase, and a post-test 
phase (e.g., Sternberg & Grigorenko, 2002). The score difference between the pre- 
and post-test reflects the child’s ability to learn and is the focus of this type of 
testing. Dynamic testing has been proven successful with children that are 
disadvantaged due to factors such as cultural differences, lack of educational 
opportunities, or learning disabilities (Hessels, 1997; Sternberg et al., 2002; 
Tzuriel, 2001). I emphasize, though, that even for dynamic testing procedures, the 
content of the test is relevant. Children that are familiar with the content might 
have an advantage over the ones that do not, even though the test focuses on 
learning ability; this learning ability in itself can be influenced by familiarity as 
well. Nevertheless, dynamic testing combined with appropriate item content can 
contribute substantially to closing the cross-cultural gap in cognitive test scores. 
 
To conclude 
How are culture and children’s cognition related? There is no simple answer to the 
main question underlying this dissertation. They are related, that is for sure. This 
relation becomes visible when cross-culturally comparing cognitive test scores and 
when identifying targets for intervention in a child’s home environment. Culture 
is everywhere, bias is everywhere. It depends on the frame of reference to what 
extent the influence of culture or the presence of bias is a problem. Nevertheless, I 
conclude that a (cognitive) test is at home in the country or context in which it 
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
 
Zoals het klokje thuis tikt, tikt het nergens:  
Over de relatie tussen cultuur en cognitie van kinderen 
 
In dit proefschrift bestudeer ik de relatie tussen cultuur en cognitie van kinderen. 
Kinderen uit verschillende culturen scoren vaak verschillend op cognitieve tests. 
De oorzaak van deze bevinding zou kunnen liggen in verschillen in cognitieve 
vaardigheden, maar ook in de mate waarin de tests cultuurgebonden zijn. 
Kinderen scoren hoger op tests naarmate deze meer op hun eigen cultuur zijn 
afgestemd. Als de cultuurgebondenheid van cognitieve tests groot is, vertonen 
kinderen uit andere culturen lagere scores vanwege hun relatieve onbekendheid 
met de (inhoud van de) tests en niet per se vanwege een gebrek aan cognitieve 
vaardigheden. Er is dan sprake van bias; bias is een verzamelterm voor alle 
factoren die de vergelijkbaarheid van metingen verkregen bij verschillende 
(culturele) groepen bedreigen. Bias-gerelateerde problemen bij het meten van 
cognitie en bij het meten van kenmerken van de thuisomgeving van een kind 
spelen een belangrijke rol bij het bestuderen van de relatie tussen de concepten 
cultuur en cognitie. In dit proefschrift onderzoek ik de link tussen deze concepten 
vanuit drie invalshoeken waarbij ik rekening houd met bias. De eerste invalshoek 
heeft betrekking op het aantonen en reduceren van bias in cognitieve tests 
(Hoofdstuk 2 en 3); de tweede op de relatie tussen de thuisomgeving en cognitie 
van een kind (Hoofdstuk 4), de derde op het manipuleren van bias om antwoord te 
geven op de vraag waarom sommige tests grotere scoreverschillen tussen culturen 
laten zien dan andere (Hoofdstuk 5). 
 
Dit proefschrift levert op drie manieren een bijdrage aan de huidige literatuur. 
Ten eerste integreert het de concepten cultuur, cognitie en bias. Bias wordt niet 
slechts gezien als een meetprobleem dat vermeden moet worden; het dient 
standaard in het design van een studie te worden opgenomen. Dit doe ik in dit 
proefschrift door op bias te anticiperen, het te bestuderen en het te manipuleren. 
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Door rekening te houden met bias in plaats van te proberen het te vermijden is 
een beter zicht te krijgen op de relatie tussen cultuur en cognitie. Ten tweede 
bekijkt dit proefschrift deze relatie niet vanuit één invalshoek, maar vanuit 
meerdere invalshoeken (zoals eerder beschreven). Ten derde wordt de link tussen 
cultuur en cognitie bestudeerd in twee daarvoor bij uitstek geschikte contexten, 
namelijk India en Zuid-Afrika. Beide landen zijn multicultureel en behoren niet 
tot de westerse landen waar de meeste cognitieve tests worden ontwikkeld. Veel 
tests die gebruikt worden in India en Zuid-Afrika komen uit deze westerse landen. 
Hoe groter de crossculturele verschillen zijn tussen de oorspronkelijke context van 
een test en een andere context, des te meer potentiële bronnen van bias er zijn. 
Grote cultuurverschillen leveren dan ook goede condities voor het uitvoeren van 
een kritische test van de (crossculturele) toepasbaarheid van cognitieve tests en 
van modellen die de leefomgeving van een kind relateren aan diens cognitieve 
prestaties.   
 
Testadaptatie houdt in dat een test die in een bepaalde taal en vanuit een bepaalde 
culturele achtergrond is ontwikkeld aan een andere taal en culturele achtergrond 
wordt aangepast. Hoofdstuk 2 beschreef een kwalitatieve procedure om cognitieve 
tests te adapteren, bestaande uit iteraties van vertalen, piloten, en het aanpassen 
van het instrument. Ik maakte een onderscheid tussen vijf soorten testadaptaties; 
aanpassingen kunnen gebaseerd zijn op, respectievelijk, het onderliggende 
construct, taal aspecten, culturele gebruiken, theorieën die ten grondslag liggen 
aan de tests, of de bekendheid van stimuli en test procedures. In Hoofdstuk 2 
werden met name adaptaties op basis van onderliggende theorieën en bekendheid 
met stimuli uitgevoerd. De beschreven procedure werd toegepast om de Kaufman 
Assessment Battery for Children, second edition (KABC-II) geschikt te maken 
voor 6 tot 10 jaar oude Kannada sprekende kinderen van lage sociaal-economische 
status in Bangalore (India). Uitgebreide adaptaties waren nodig voor iedere 
subtest; de adaptaties betroffen de testinstructies, de iteminhoud van zowel 
verbale als niet-verbale tests en de itemvolgorde. Er werd geconcludeerd dat deze 
kwalitatieve benadering adequaat bleek voor het identificeren van allerlei 
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problemen met de toepasbaarheid van de KABC-II voor deze steekproef die 
onopgemerkt zouden zijn gebleven bij een directe vertaling van het originele 
instrument. De studie toonde aan dat voor een adequaat gebruik van westerse 
cognitieve instrumenten in een niet-westerse context een nauwkeurige analyse 
van hun toepasbaarheid nodig is. 
 
Hoofdstuk 3 evalueerde de psychometrische kwaliteit van de adaptatie van de 
KABC-II die in het vorige hoofdstuk werd beschreven. Data van 598 kinderen 
lieten hoge betrouwbaarheden zien voor alle subtests, het Cattell-Horn-Carroll 
model dat ten grondslag ligt aan de originele KABC-II werd grotendeels 
gerepliceerd, en correlaties met demografische eigenschappen en schoolprestaties 
waren in lijn met de verwachtingen. De subtests laadden relatief hoog op een 
algemene cognitieve factor, waarschijnlijk vanwege de onbekendheid en daardoor 
de hoge complexiteit van deze tests voor deze kinderen. De bevindingen 
bevestigden de geschiktheid en validiteit van de KABC-II adaptatie. De resultaten 
van Hoofdstuk 2 en 3 geven tezamen aan dat testadaptaties slechts adequaat 
kunnen zijn als ze zowel aan kwalitatieve als kwantitatieve (statistische) criteria 
voldoen.  
 
Hoofdstuk 4 bestudeerde de relatie tussen de thuisomgeving en cognitieve 
prestaties van Indiase kinderen. De primaire verzorgers van 532 kinderen waarbij 
de KABC-II was afgenomen (zie Hoofdstuk 3) werden geïnterviewd. Een 
padmodel bevestigde de toepasbaarheid van omgeving-cognitie relaties die in de 
literatuur voorgesteld zijn; ik doel hier op het investeringsmodel en het familie 
stressmodel, die beide voornamelijk op westerse data gebaseerd zijn. Meer 
proximale variabelen (de geestelijke gezondheid van de primaire verzorger, sociale 
steun, gezinsconflicten, en gedragingen van de ouders) lieten sterkere associaties 
zien met cognitieve prestaties dan meer distale variabelen (sociaal-economische 
status); de link tussen laatstgenoemde en cognitieve uitkomsten werd volledig 
gemedieerd door de meer proximale variabelen. Alleen de betrokkenheid van de 
ouders bij hun kind door middel van het bieden van directe stimulatie en 
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structuur was direct gerelateerd aan uitkomsten. Interventies die erop gericht zijn 
om de ontwikkeling van kinderen te bevorderen zouden zich daarom moeten 
richten op de meest proximale gedragingen van de ouders.  
 
Ik veronderstel in Hoofdstuk 5 dat crossculturele verschillen in cognitieve test 
scores afhankelijk zijn van de culturele complexiteit van een test (Culturele 
Complexiteits-Hypothese) en niet zozeer van de cognitieve complexiteit ervan 
(Spearman’s Hypothese). Culturele complexiteit werd in dit hoofdstuk 
geconceptualiseerd als de mate waarin de testinhoud (woorden en plaatjes) 
bekender is voor één van de te vergelijken groepen. In dit hoofdstuk werd deze 
bekendheid van testinhoud gemanipuleerd voor vijf cognitieve tests (voor korte 
termijngeheugen, aandacht, werkgeheugen, en figuraal en verbaal redeneren) om 
het effect ervan op testprestatie te bestuderen. Van iedere test werden twee versies 
gemaakt: een Afrikaanse en een Tswana testversie, met een inhoud die erg bekend 
is voor Zuid-Afrikaanse kinderen met respectievelijk een Afrikaanse en Tswana 
achtergrond. De steekproef bestond uit 501 schoolgaande kinderen uit de derde en 
vierde klas van het basisonderwijs (161 urbane Afrikaans sprekende kinderen, en 
181 urbane en 159 rurale Setswana sprekende kinderen). De resultaten waren niet 
in overeenstemming met Spearman’s Hypothese en leverden bevestiging voor de 
Culturele Complexiteits-Hypothese; kinderen presteerden over het algemeen 
beter op de testversie die voor hun eigen groep was ontwikkeld dan op de andere 
testversie. Dit effect was het sterkst op de cognitief (en cultureel) complexe 
werkgeheugen en redeneertests. De bekendheid van de inhoud van een test is een 
belangrijke moderator van cognitieve testprestaties waar, met name bij 
crossculturele vergelijkingen van testscores, rekening mee gehouden dient te 
worden. 
 
De praktische relevantie van dit proefschrift komt tot uitdrukking in drie 
aspecten. Ten eerste vergroot het ons inzicht in de aard van crossculturele 
scoreverschillen. Ik heb in Hoofdstuk 5 laten zien dat culturele complexiteit een 
belangrijkere rol speelt in het verklaren van scoreverschillen dan het niveau van 
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cognitieve vaardigheden dat ervoor nodig was om op een test goed te presteren. 
Onderzoek waarvan het doel is om crossculturele verschillen in testscores onder 
de loep te nemen, moet rekening houden met beide verklaringen. We moeten 
voorzichtig zijn met het trekken van conclusies over de vraag of cognitieve of 
culturele complexiteit belangrijker is.  
 
Ten tweede levert het proefschrift richtlijnen voor het ontwikkelen van een test 
die adequaat is voor een bepaalde cultuur. Het is gebruikelijk om tests direct te 
vertalen in de taal van de doelgroep zonder verdere aanpassingen te maken. 
Wanneer tests in een andere context worden gebruikt zonder veranderingen aan 
te brengen in stimuli, instructies, of procedures, is de validiteit twijfelachtig in het 
geval van een grote culturele kloof tussen de originele cultuur en de cultuur van 
de doelgroep. Dit proefschrift laat zien dat adaptatie een bruikbaar middel kan zijn 
om deze kloof te overbruggen. Het is echter onmogelijk om een test te maken die 
even bekend is voor alle bestudeerde groepen, wat impliceert dat het onmogelijk is 
om bias volledig te verwijderen. Blijkbaar levert decontextualiseren niet het 
gewenste effect en is het beter om juist tests te contextualiseren (i.e., rekening 
houden met bias in plaats van proberen het te vermijden), door ervoor te zorgen 
dat tests zo bekend als mogelijk zijn voor de doelgroep. 
 
Een geschikt instrumentarium om het functioneren van een kind te meten is 
nodig om betekenisvolle interventies uit te voeren ten behoeve van de 
ontwikkeling van een kind. Om doelen te identificeren voor dergelijke 
interventies is het van belang te weten welke factoren in het dagelijks leven van 
een kind positief of negatief samenhangen met deze ontwikkeling. Dit proefschrift 
draagt bij aan dit proces door de (crossculturele validiteit van) relaties te 
bestuderen tussen bepaalde variabelen in the thuisomgeving en de cognitieve 
prestaties van een kind. Dit is de derde praktische bijdrage van dit proefschrift. In 
Hoofdstuk 4 heb ik laten zien dat de aspecten die ertoe doen, die aspecten in de 
thuisomgeving zijn die het meest proximaal zijn ten opzichte van deze prestaties. 
Moeders bewust maken van de directe invloed die zij kunnen hebben op de 
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cognitieve prestaties van hun kinderen vormt een belangrijk doel van interventies 
ter stimulering van de ontwikkeling van kinderen. Directe betrokkenheid van de 
ouders bij het kind door het bieden van structuur en stimulatie blijkt essentieel.  
 
Hoe zijn cultuur en de cognitie van kinderen aan elkaar gerelateerd? Er is geen 
eenvoudig antwoord te geven op de vraag die ten grondslag ligt aan dit 
proefschrift. Er is een relatie, dat is zeker. Cultuur bepaalt onder meer welke 
factoren in de thuisomgeving van een kind van belang zijn voor een goede 
ontwikkeling en welke cognitieve vaardigheden gewaardeerd (en daardoor 
gestimuleerd) worden. Cultuur beïnvloedt ook de mate waarin tests bias vertonen 
in het meten van deze omgevingsfactoren en cognitieve vaardigheden. Waar 
cultuur is, is bias. Het is niet mogelijk om helemaal van bias af te komen; 
vertrouwdheid met (de inhoud van) tests heeft een grote invloed op testprestaties. 
Het hangt echter af van de situatie in welke mate de aanwezigheid van bias een 
probleem is. Toch concludeer ik dat een (cognitieve) test het meest thuis is in het 
land of de context waarin deze is ontwikkeld of waarvoor deze is geadapteerd. Het 
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